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RISING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER”
JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES
Paul R. Gugliuzza*
ABSTRACT
By statute, all cases “arising under” patent law must be heard exclusively
by the federal courts (not state courts) and, on appeal, by the Federal Circuit
(not the twelve regional circuits). But not all cases involving patents “arise
under” patent law. As recently as 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere
need to apply patent law in, for example, a malpractice case involving a patent
lawyer, is insufficient to trigger exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, the Court held,
for a case that does not involve claims of patent infringement to arise under
patent law, the patent issue must be “important … to the federal system as a
whole.”
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding that “fact-bound and situationspecific” patent issues do not warrant exclusive jurisdiction outside of
infringement cases, the lower courts’ precedent in this area remains unsettled.
The Federal Circuit has, at times, tried to resurrect its older case law extending
exclusive jurisdiction to practically any patent-related tort, contract, or antitrust
case. But, in other decisions, the Federal Circuit has constricted jurisdiction so
dramatically that the Fifth Circuit recently refused to accept a case transferred
to it by the Federal Circuit, deriding the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling
as not just wrong but “implausible.” All of this uncertainty incentivizes costly
and wasteful procedural maneuvering in a field where litigation is already
expensive.
This Article is the first to chronicle the rising confusion about the scope of
the federal district courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over
cases arising under patent law. The Article critiques the case law emerging in
the lower federal courts and proposes a jurisdictional rule that is both clear and
consistent with Supreme Court precedent: For a case that does not involve
claims of patent infringement to nevertheless arise under patent law, it must
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present a dispute about the content of federal patent law or a question about the
interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute; questions about the
validity or scope of a particular patent are not sufficient.
In arguing for this new approach, the Article also engages broader questions
about the jurisdictional structure of patent litigation. Among other things, it
suggests that the courts or Congress should rethink longstanding doctrine that
makes the test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction identical to the test for
exclusive original jurisdiction in the district courts. Exclusive district court
jurisdiction entirely precludes state courts from shaping their own state’s law,
so federal courts should be hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over a tort or
contract claim simply because there is a patent lurking in the background. But
when a patent-related case is properly in federal district court, the Federal
Circuit’s expertise in patent law and ability to provide uniformity counsel in
favor of giving the court a broad scope of appellate jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal district courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
cases “arising under” patent law.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over those same cases.2 At first blush,
this regime seems simple: State courts may not hear patent cases, only federal
courts can. And when there is an appeal in a patent case, it goes to the Federal
Circuit, not one of the twelve regional circuits. Yet subject matter jurisdiction in
patent cases is, surprisingly, one of the thorniest issues in all of civil procedure.
In a 2013 opinion holding that legal malpractice claims against patent
attorneys do not fall within the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that, in deciding the jurisdictional issue, “we do not paint
on a blank canvas.”3 “Unfortunately,” he continued, “the canvas looks like one
that Jackson Pollock got to first.”4 In an earlier Supreme Court case on the scope
of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court had to step in to stop
what it called a “game of jurisdictional ping-pong” in which the dispute had been
transferred from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit and back again to the
Federal Circuit,5 with each court “adamantly disavow[ing] jurisdiction” and
each court “insist[ing] that the other’s jurisdictional decision [was] ‘clearly
wrong.’”6
Despite frequent Supreme Court decisions on patent jurisdiction and recent
congressional amendments to the relevant statutes,7 confusion persists. Indeed,
as the title of this Article suggests,8 it seems to be getting worse. In February
2019, in a decision that attracted widespread attention from both patent lawyers

1
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents…. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim
for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents ….”).
2
Id. § 1295(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States … in any civil action arising
under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of
Congress relating to patents ….”).
3
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).
4
Id.
5
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988).
6
Id. at 803 (citation omitted).
7
In addition to the Gunn and Christianson cases cited in the preceding footnotes, the Supreme Court
tackled a patent-related issue of subject matter jurisdiction in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002), holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over a case in
which patent infringement was asserted only as a counterclaim—a decision Congress overruled in the America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011).
8
For inspiring that title, credit is due to Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing
Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695 (2011).
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and scholars, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide an appeal that had been
transferred to it by the Federal Circuit, deriding the Federal Circuit’s ruling
declining jurisdiction as not just wrong but “implausible” and transferring the
case back to the Federal Circuit.9 A month later, the Federal Circuit, despite
numerous “flaws” it identified in the Fifth Circuit’s transfer opinion, reluctantly
accepted jurisdiction, seemingly ending this particular match of jurisdictional
table tennis.10 But the harsh words the Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit traded
about each other’s understanding of the relevant jurisdictional doctrine—as well
as clear and persistent conflicts in the Federal Circuit’s own jurisdictional
precedent11—suggests that the Supreme Court, or perhaps the Federal Circuit en
banc, will eventually have to step in to alleviate the rising confusion over arising
under jurisdiction in patent cases.12
To be sure, in many patent disputes, subject matter jurisdiction is not
seriously contested. A case in which a plaintiff asserts a claim of patent
infringement, for example, plainly arises under patent law.13 The same goes for
claims seeking declaratory judgments that a patent is invalid or not infringed.14
Infringement and declaratory judgment claims are actually created by federal
9
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819 (holding that a transferee court should
accept jurisdiction over a patent appeal so long as the transfer decision is “plausible” and not “clearly
erroneous”). For a sample of commentary on the Xitronix case, see Dennis Crouch, Walker-Process Antitrust
Case Is Back Before the Federal Circuit, PATENTLYO (Feb. 24, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/02/
process-antitrust-federal.html; Bryan Koenig, Xitronix Patent Antitrust Row Not Welcome at 5th Circ. Either,
LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1130148; Mark Lemley (@marklemley),
TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://twitter.com/marklemley/status/1098394441436413952 (“Anyone
want a patent-antitrust case? The Federal Circuit sent this case to the Fifth Circuit, saying they didn’t have
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit just sent it back, saying [the Federal Circuit] w[as] the only court that DID have
jurisdiction.”).
10
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 757 F. App’x 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019). The Federal Circuit’s decision likewise grabbed headlines in the world of
patent law. See, e.g., Tiffany Hu, Fed. Circ. Ends Ping-Pong with 5th Circ. on IP Antitrust Suit, LAW360 (Mar.
14, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1138869.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See Bryan Koenig, Justices’ Cert Denial Won’t Quell Circuit ‘Pingpong’ Matches, LAW360 (Oct. 18,
2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1211080/justices-cert-denial-won-t-quell-circuit-pingpongmatches (noting that the Supreme Court’s denial of cert. in Xitronix “left intact binding precedent” in each
circuit—the Federal Circuit and the Fifth Circuit—“that the case belonged in the other court”); Bryan Lammon,
Cert Petition: Patent Appeals & Jurisdictional Hot Potato, FINAL DECISIONS (July 31, 2019), https://
finaldecisions.org/cert-petition-patent-appeals-jurisdictional-hot-potato (“[T]he state of the law must be
maddening for practitioners. What are parties in future Walker Process suits to do? File in the regional circuit
(which the Federal Circuit thinks is proper) but risk the regional circuit sending the case to the Federal Circuit
(like the Fifth Circuit did)? Or should they file first in the Federal Circuit (which the Fifth Circuit thought was
proper) and wait for the Federal Circuit to transfer the case to the regional circuit?”).
13
13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3582 (3d ed. 2008).
14
Id.
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patent law,15 so there is no question that cases containing those claims fall within
the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.16 But
confusion occurs because many cases that do not include claims for patent
infringement nevertheless implicate patent law and therefore potentially “arise
under” patent law for jurisdictional purposes.17 For example, plaintiffs often
base antitrust claims on patent-related conduct.18 Though patent-related antitrust
claims are usually (but not always) asserted under federal statutes such as the
Sherman Act, claims created by state law can raise patent issues, too.19 Common
examples include suits for breach of a patent licensing contract,20 tort claims
based on false allegations of patent infringement,21 and malpractice claims
against lawyers who litigated a prior infringement dispute or who prosecuted a
patent.22
Under current law, it is often unclear whether these patent-related cases
“arise under” patent law for the purpose of triggering the federal district courts’
and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction. For several decades, the Federal
Circuit held that cases involving claims created by state law or by a federal law
besides the Patent Act nevertheless arose under patent law any time the case
required the court to apply patent law.23 Almost all claims for breach of a patent
license agreement met that lenient standard because those cases usually focus on
questions about patent scope (which determines the extent of the defendant’s
obligation to pay royalties) and validity (because a ruling of invalidity can
nullify the defendant’s obligation to pay any royalties at all). The same goes for
most tort claims involving patent enforcement conduct because they usually
15

See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action.”).
17
See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (“It has come to be
realized that Mr. Justice Holmes’ formula,” see supra note 16, “is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion
for which it was intended.”). See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3582 (surveying the types of
non-patent cases that arise under patent law).
18
See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2010)
(antitrust challenge to a “reverse payment” settlement of patent litigation); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (different appeal in the same litigation).
19
See, e.g., Eon Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D. Mass. 2003)
(state antitrust claims based on the defendant’s conduct in enforcing a patent).
20
See generally Amelia Smith Rinehart, The Federal Question in Patent-License Cases, 90 IND. L.J. 659,
662–68 (2015) (citing numerous case examples).
21
See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1588–90 (2015)
(citing case examples).
22
In addition to the Gunn case cited above, see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1809–15 (2013) (citing additional malpractice cases).
23
See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478–79 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
16
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hinge on whether a patentee’s allegations of infringement were accurate.
Similarly, patent-related malpractice claims ask what would have happened in
patent infringement litigation or patent prosecution but for the attorney’s alleged
negligence—a question that plainly requires the court to apply federal patent
law.
In a prior article,24 I argued that this Federal Circuit case law was in tension
with Supreme Court precedent holding that the “mere need to apply federal law”
will not cause a case to arise under that law.25 And, in 2013, the Supreme Court
overturned the Federal Circuit’s precedent. In Gunn v. Minton, the Court held
that malpractice claims against patent attorneys “will rarely, if ever, arise under
federal patent law” because they implicate only backward-looking, case-specific
issues that are not important “to the federal system as a whole.”26
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn seemed to offer a relatively clear rule:
The mere need to apply patent law is not sufficient to cause a case to arise under
patent law; rather, resolution of the patent issue must have significant
consequences for more than just the parties to the case.27 But the Federal Circuit
has a reputation for resisting the Supreme Court’s efforts to modify patent
doctrine.28 As I show in this Article, the Federal Circuit has at times lived up to
that reputation in the realm of subject matter jurisdiction.29
Initially, the Federal Circuit tried to blunt the effects of Gunn by limiting the
Supreme Court’s holding to its specific facts—interpreting the decision to
preclude jurisdiction only when, as in the Gunn case itself, the relevant patent

24

See Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1815.
Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005).
26
568 U.S. 251, 258, 260 (2013).
27
See id. at 263–64 (ruling that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the effects of the case “would
be limited to the parties and patents that [were] before the … court” and would not create “binding precedent for
any future patent claim”).
28
See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 38 (2014)
(“[T]hese opinions raise the possibility of the appearance that Federal Circuit judges are trying to resist Supreme
Court precedent ….”); Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent Federalism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 551, 592
(2017) (“The Federal Circuit is notorious for resisting Supreme Court guidance.”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña,
Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 124 (2015)
(“An analysis of Federal Circuit case law reveals a pattern of resistance to implementing Supreme Court
decisions overruling Federal Circuit precedent ….”).
29
Some commentators have suggested that the Federal Circuit has become more deferential to the
Supreme Court over the past decade or so. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Federal Circuit’s
Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has reengaged with patent law,
and, after an initial period of resistance, the Federal Circuit increasingly is following the Court’s precedent with
little pushback.”). The analysis in this Article at least partly challenges that notion of Federal Circuit
acquiescence.
25
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had already been invalidated or was no longer in force.30 More recent Federal
Circuit decisions—by different panels of judges—have attempted to walk back
that cramped interpretation of Gunn.31 The results in those cases are more
faithful to the Supreme Court’s precedent, but they raise their own problems.
For one, although those Federal Circuit opinions probably reach the correct
result under binding Supreme Court doctrine, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning has
been highly suspect—so much so that the Fifth Circuit, as mentioned, recently
sent a case back to the Federal Circuit because the Fifth Circuit found the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdictional analysis to be deeply flawed.32 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit’s decisions adopting a narrow conception of arising under jurisdiction
create clear intracircuit splits that leave state courts, federal district courts, and
the regional circuits—all of whom often must decide questions of patent
jurisdiction in the first instance—with no helpful guidance from a court whose
primary reason for existence is to provide uniformity in patent law.33
This uncertainty encourages parties to engage in wasteful litigation about
matters entirely collateral to the merits of the case—not something the law
should incentivize in a field in which litigation is already expensive.34 And, to
be clear, the consequences of a mistake about whether a case arises under patent
law are severe. It is black-letter law that defects in subject matter jurisdiction
may not be waived by the parties and can be raised at any time—including after
trial or on appeal.35 Thus, a flaw in subject matter jurisdiction can wipe out years
of litigation and result in millions of dollars wasted.
The new jurisdictional regime proposed by this Article will help mitigate
those effects by providing a clear rule that should be easy to apply in most cases.
30
See, e.g., Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v.
Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Gunn, 568 U.S. at 261 (noting that,
regardless of the outcome of the malpractice case, “Minton’s patent will remain invalid”),
31
See, e.g., Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alps South, LLC v.
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2018).
32
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
33
For an opinion highlighting the inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisdictional decisions,
see Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J., dissenting from
the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
34
See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 56
(2016) (arguing that, because recent changes to patent law seem to have had little effect on patent acquisition
and enforcement, reformers should instead “look out for opportunities to simplify patent litigation, making it
quicker and cheaper” (emphasis added)).
35
13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3522. In Gunn, for instance, the plaintiff—who chose to file the
case in state court—was the party who objected to the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and he did so only
on appeal after he had lost on the merits in the trial court. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 255 (2013).
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Specifically, the Article argues that, as the Supreme Court suggested in Gunn,
cases that do not contain claims for patent infringement or for declaratory
judgments of invalidity or noninfringement should be viewed to arise under
patent law only in rare circumstances.36 For such a case to trigger the federal
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, I argue, it should present
a dispute about the content of federal patent law or a question about the
interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute.37 This rule, which also
clarifies some lingering ambiguities in the Gunn opinion itself,38 will probably
not eliminate litigation over subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases. But it
will make the law look less like a Jackson Pollock painting and more like a Mark
Rothko.39
Though this Article focuses primarily on a confusing issue at the intersection
of patent law and civil procedure, its analysis has relevance beyond patent
litigation. The question it examines—when does a case consisting entirely of
non-patent claims nevertheless arise under federal patent law?—is a species of
a particularly “vexing” question in civil procedure more broadly.40 Under the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have
jurisdiction over all cases “arising under” federal law,41 so they sometimes must
decide whether, in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, they can hear a case that
involves only claims created by state law but that implicates issues of federal
law.42 This Article is highly pertinent to that question, too: Not only do both the
patent-specific and general federal question statutes use the same “arising under”
terminology, the courts often treat patent and non-patent jurisdictional case law
as interchangeable.43
36
See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (characterizing the “category” of state law claims that nevertheless arise
under federal law as “special and small” and “slim”).
37
See infra Part III.A.1.
38
See infra notes 282–95 and accompanying text.
39
Rothko’s most famous works are his so-called multiforms—blocks of various colors devoid of any
landscape or human features. See Mark Rothko—Artist Gallery of Career Highlights Including His Most Famous
Paintings, MARK ROTHKO, http://www.markrothko.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). The borders of Rothko’s
blocks are blurry or slightly irregular, just as there will still be disputes at the boundaries of the jurisdictional
rule I propose. But a Rothko painting portrays a sense of order that is largely absent from Pollock’s iconic drip
paintings that Chief Justice Roberts referenced in Gunn. See, e.g., Jackson Pollock, One: Number 31, 1950
(1950), MOMA.ORG, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78386 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
40
13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562.
41
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
42
E.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311, 314–15 (2005)
(upholding federal question jurisdiction over a state law quiet title case that turned on whether the IRS, when it
seized the plaintiff’s land, had provided the plaintiff with the notice required by the federal tax statute).
43
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (“‘[L]inguistic
consistency’ requires us to apply the same test to determine whether a case arises under § 1338(a) as under
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Still, subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases merits its own study because,
for at least three reasons, the stakes are potentially higher in disputes over patent
jurisdiction than they are in federal question cases more generally. First, federal
jurisdiction over cases that arise under patent law is exclusive of the state courts
(unlike under the general federal question statute, where federal courts and state
courts share concurrent jurisdiction), so disputes over patent jurisdiction have
major federalism implications. If exclusive jurisdiction does indeed exist over a
patent-related state law claim, then that state’s courts will be entirely prohibited
from shaping their own state’s law in that area.44 Second, unlike under the
general federal question statute, which is relevant only to the division of
authority between the state and federal courts, the question of whether a case
arises under patent law also implicates questions of appellate jurisdiction
because it allocates cases between the Federal Circuit (which is thought to have
special expertise in patent matters) and the regional circuits (which rarely hear
patent cases). Finally, federal patent jurisdiction is animated by a unique policy
aim: uniformity. Though uniformity is thought to be beneficial in all areas of
law,45 judges and commentators frequently stress the singular importance of
uniformity in patent cases, both in terms of the treatment of a given patent46 and
in terms of legal doctrine more generally.47 These distinctive characteristics of
patent litigation suggest a need for independent analysis about whether and in
§ 1331.”); see also Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a), Congress placed the resolution of actions arising under an Act of Congress relating to patents
exclusively within the federal courts. Through 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), Congress placed appeals from such
matters exclusively within the province of the Federal Circuit.”).
44
See generally Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013) (refusing to find exclusive federal
jurisdiction over a patent-related malpractice case because “[t]he States … have ‘a special responsibility for
maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions’” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,
436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978))).
45
For a challenge to that conventional view, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567, 1570–71 (2008).
46
See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 851 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Uniformity is a critical feature of our patent system because ‘[t]he limits of a patent must be known ….’”
(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996))); Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (“[W]e
see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues
of [claim] construction to the court [rather than to a jury].”).
47
See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 649 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying “national uniformity” as “the principle that undergirds all aspects of our
patent system”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63 (1989) (“Given the
inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, and the great power such property has to cause harm to the
competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public and private
right is the ‘type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.’” (quoting Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 179 (1978))); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21
(distinguishing between legal uniformity, that is, uniformity in the substantive rules of patent law, and
adjudicative uniformity, that is, the notion that “a particular patent should be construed similarly from one case
to another and that courts should not reach inconsistent validity findings regarding the same patent”).
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what circumstances patent cases should be centralized in the federal district
courts and the Federal Circuit as opposed to being distributed more widely
among state courts or the regional circuits.48
This Article’s analysis of subject matter jurisdiction in patent cases also
raises deeper questions about the institutional design of and judicial behavior in
the patent system. In terms of institutional design, the Article argues that it
makes little sense to have identical tests for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction
and exclusive district court jurisdiction, as is the case under current law. For the
district courts, there are good reasons, grounded in concerns about federalism
and comity, to be cautious about asserting exclusive jurisdiction over state law
claims just because there is a patent in the case.49 But once a patent-related case
is properly in federal court (because, for instance, diversity jurisdiction
indisputably exists), there are no similarly good reasons for the Federal Circuit—
which was created to provide uniformity and expertise on patent matters50—to
defer to the other federal courts of appeals. Accordingly, the relevant
jurisdictional statutes should be amended by Congress or reinterpreted by the
courts to make the test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction broader than the
test for exclusive district court jurisdiction.51
In terms of judicial behavior, the Article demonstrates that the divergent
views about jurisdiction espoused in the Federal Circuit’s case law are highly
judge-specific.52 Certain judges consistently interpret the scope of arising under
jurisdiction broadly, while other judges consistently take a narrower view.
Though the set of post-Gunn jurisdictional decisions is small, this Article’s
analysis contributes to a robust literature documenting panel-dependency on the
Federal Circuit in numerous areas of patent law.53 The deep-seated and divergent

48
See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–71 (questioning whether exclusive federal jurisdiction
is necessary to ensure legal and adjudicative uniformity in patent matters); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2007) (challenging the view
that the need for uniformity warrants appellate centralization of patent cases).
49
See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562 (noting that “the overzealous exercise of
federal question jurisdiction [can] threaten the legitimate interest of the states in having their courts interpret
state law”).
50
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1456 (2012).
51
See infra Part III.B.
52
See infra Part III.C.
53
See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71
VAND. L. REV. 765, 801 (2018) (finding links between particular judges’ substantive views on patentable subject
matter doctrine and those judges’ tendency to decide cases involving that issue in precedential versus
nonprecedential decisions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163 (2004) (finding evidence of panel
dependency on the question of patent claim construction).
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views held by the court’s judges underscore the need for new, clearer
jurisdictional rules—such as those proposed in this Article—that would be
harder to manipulate in service of a preferred policy outcome. The intracircuit
inconsistencies in Federal Circuit jurisdictional law also highlight a potential
shortcoming of the Federal Circuit as an institution54: The narrowness of the
court’s jurisdiction encourages its judges to develop definite and detailed
normative preferences about issues of patent law and policy, and it provides
them with ample opportunities to express and implement those preferences.
These dynamics create confusion for litigants and judges, that confusion
increases litigation costs, and those litigation costs can chill innovation—
defeating the very purpose of having a patent system in the first place.55
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides
necessary background on the law governing federal subject matter jurisdiction,
both in patent cases and otherwise. Part II documents the persistent and
continuing confusion about the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction over patent cases, and it provides a thorough critique of post-Gunn
developments in both the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits. Finally, Part
III sketches a novel jurisdictional rule that is faithful to Supreme Court
precedent, would reduce litigation over forum selection, and would balance the
need for uniformity in patent law with the autonomy of state courts to shape their
own states’ laws, including in patent-related cases. Part III also tackles two
fundamental questions about the institutional structure of patent litigation,
proposing a new test for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction that is broader
than the test for exclusive district court jurisdiction and examining what the
panel dependency of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional case law indicates about
judicial behavior on specialized courts.
I.

THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: OVER PATENT
CASES AND OTHERWISE

To start, a primer on the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over cases
involving federal law, and patent cases specifically, will prove helpful. This Part
first summarizes the statutory bases for that jurisdiction and describes the types
54
For a foundational analysis of the Federal Circuit as an institution, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). For an extensive bibliography
of the relevant literature, see Ryan Vacca, The Federal Circuit as an Institution, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 104, 155-57 (Peter S. Menell, David L. Schwartz & Ben
Depoorter eds. 2019).
55
On the connection between litigation dynamics and innovation incentives, see generally Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 643 (2019).
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of disputes that qualify for adjudication by the federal courts. It then surveys the
Federal Circuit’s historically expansive understanding of the scope of its and the
lower federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes—an
understanding the Supreme Court rejected in 2013 in Gunn v. Minton.56
A. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction: The Basics
Under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal law.57
This jurisdiction is concurrent with the state courts—if a plaintiff files a federal
question case in state court and the defendant does not (or cannot) remove it,
then the federal case will proceed in state court.58 The statute granting the federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases, § 1338(a), uses language
similar to the general federal question statute, giving the district courts original
jurisdiction over any case “arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents.”59 Section 1338(a), however, makes the federal courts’ jurisdiction over
patent cases exclusive, providing that “[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”60
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, § 1295(a)(1), also employs this
“arising under” language, granting the court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from district courts in any case “arising under” patent law.61
The courts have interpreted the “arising under” language in all of these
statutes identically.62 In other words, the analysis of whether a case arises under
federal law generally or under patent law specifically will, with one minor
exception involving patent-based counterclaims,63 look the same—the only
difference will be the consequence of that ruling. If a case arises under federal
56

568 U.S. 251, 264–65 (2013).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
58
See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378 (2012) (“In cases ‘arising under’ federal law
… ‘there is a deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction’....” (quoting Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990))).
59
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
60
Id.; see also id. § 1454(a) (permitting removal from state to federal court in any “civil action in which
any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”).
61
Id. § 1295(a)(1).
62
See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013) (“Adhering to the demands of ‘[l]inguistic
consistency,’ we have interpreted the phrase ‘arising under’ in both sections identically, applying our § 1331
and § 1338(a) precedents interchangeably.” (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,
808 (1988))); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“While the parties
argue Gunn is inapplicable because it concerns district court jurisdiction over state claims, the indistinguishable
statutory language of §§ 1295 and 1338 requires our careful consideration of Gunn in interpreting our
jurisdictional statute.”).
63
See infra note 64.
57
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law generally, the state and federal courts will have concurrent jurisdiction, and
appellate jurisdiction will lie in the regional circuit encompassing the district
court. But if a case arises under patent law specifically, federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, and any appeal will be heard by the Federal Circuit.64
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a case can “arise under” federal
law (either federal law generally or patent law specifically) in two ways. First, a
case arises under federal law if federal law actually creates the plaintiff’s legal
claim.65 As the Supreme Court has noted, this first category “accounts for the
vast bulk of suits that arise under federal law.”66 An example of a case in this
category is one involving a claim for patent infringement. A federal statute, 35
U.S.C. § 281, actually gives a patentee the right to file suit in federal court if its
patent has been infringed.67 Therefore, cases involving claims for patent
infringement fall within the federal courts’ federal question jurisdiction. Indeed,
because of § 1338(a), those cases fall within the federal courts’ exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction and, because of § 1295(a)(1), any appeal will go to the
Federal Circuit.
Second, and more controversially, a case can arise under federal law even if
the plaintiff’s claim is created by state law if that state law claim raises a
“substantial” issue of federal law.68 The modern origin of this wing of federal
question jurisdiction is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., in which the
Supreme Court upheld federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim
seeking to stop a bank from investing in bonds issued under a federal statute (the

64
As noted, there is one minor way in which the jurisdictional analysis under the federal question statute,
§ 1331, and the patent-specific statute, § 1338(a), differs. That difference involves the so-called well-pleaded
complaint rule. Under the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting § 1331 (most famously, Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)), the federal question providing the basis for jurisdiction must appear
in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, that is, in the plaintiff’s statement of its own claims. Neither federal
issues raised in defense, nor federal counterclaims, will create federal question jurisdiction. Holmes Grp., Inc.
v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002). In patent cases, by contrast, Congress has
partially relaxed the well-pleaded complaint rule, providing that patent law counterclaims do, in fact, cause a
case to arise under patent law. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011).
Patent law defenses, however, remain insufficient.
65
The classic articulation of this basis for federal question jurisdiction appears in Justice Holmes’s
opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the
law that creates the cause of action.”).
66
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257.
67
See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.”).
68
This requirement is sometimes referred to as the “centrality” requirement or the “essential federal
element” requirement, in the sense that it requires the embedded federal issue to be “central” or “essential” to
the state law claim being asserted. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 246 (4th ed. 2017); A. BENJAMIN
SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 255 (5th ed. 2018).
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federal Farm Loan Act) because the state law claim turned on whether the
federal statute violated the U.S. Constitution.69 In what the Supreme Court later
characterized as “a somewhat generous statement of the scope of” federal
question jurisdiction over state-created claims,70 the Court in Smith wrote that a
state-created claim falls within federal question jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s
“right to relief depends upon the construction or application of” federal law.71
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that this class of statecreated claims that arise under federal law is “slim.”72 To set the boundaries of
arising under jurisdiction over state law claims that have federal issues
embedded within them, the Supreme Court has developed a four-element test:
“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved
by Congress.”73
Because the class of state law claims within federal question jurisdiction is
small and sometimes difficult to define,74 many observers have queried whether
this category should even exist.75 Indeed, after the Supreme Court’s 1986
decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thomson,76 some lower courts
and commentators thought the Court had actually limited federal question
jurisdiction to cases involving claims created by federal law—the first category
described above.77 The plaintiffs in Merrell Dow asserted state law tort claims
69

255 U.S. 180, 201–02 (1921).
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–13 (2005).
71
Smith, 255 U.S. at 199.
72
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013); see also Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006) (“special and small category”).
73
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258.
74
See, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s quip about the Jackson Pollock canvas. See also FREER, supra
note 68, at 246 (noting that the question of whether a state law claim arises under federal law “is a relatively
amorphous inquiry,” turning on several Supreme Court opinions “that are difficult to reconcile”).
75
Justice Thomas, for instance, seems willing to consider abolishing federal question jurisdiction over
state-created claims. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the “‘vast majority’ of
cases that come within § 1331 under our current case law” involve claims created by federal law, and that “trying
to sort out which cases fall within the smaller … category [of state-claims subject to federal question jurisdiction]
may not be worth the effort it entails” (citations omitted)). But cf. Ann Woolhander & Michael G. Collins,
Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2153 (2009) (presenting a
historical study suggesting that, prior to Justice Holmes’s opinion in American Well Works, see supra note 65,
cases involving state law claims with embedded federal issues “were perhaps the paradigm ‘arising under’
cases”).
76
478 U.S. 804 (1986).
77
See, e.g., 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, § 3562 (“[B]y stressing the lack of a federal claim, the
majority seemed to embrace a notion that federal question jurisdiction exists only for the vindication of federal
claims; if Congress does not create a claim, it is difficult, under Merrell Dow, to determine when (if ever) a
70
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for damages they allegedly suffered when their mothers took the drug Bendectin
while pregnant.78 One of the plaintiffs’ theories was negligence per se based on
the defendant’s alleged mislabeling of its drug in violation of the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).79 That is, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendant was liable under state tort law because its drug’s label violated a
federal statute. But the Supreme Court ruled that federal question jurisdiction
did not exist, noting, among other things, that Congress could have created a
federal claim for violations of the FDCA, that Congress chose not to do so, and
that the Court was “not free to ‘supplement’ that decision in a way that makes
[Congress’s decision] meaningless.”80
Two decades later, however, the Supreme Court clarified that certain statecreated claims can, in fact, arise under federal law and create federal question
jurisdiction. In Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue, the IRS had seized land
owned by Grable to satisfy a federal tax delinquency.81 The IRS sold the land to
Darue.82 Grable then brought a state law quiet title suit, claiming that Darue’s
title was invalid because the IRS did not notify Grable of the seizure in the
manner required by the federal tax statute.83
The Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction over Grable’s state law
claim.84 It first noted that, over the past century, it had “sh[ied] away from the
expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will
suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.”85 Rather, the Court viewed its
precedent as “confin[ing] federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims to
those [claims] that ‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’”86

claim might arise under federal law.”); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,
1793 (1992) (suggesting that, after Merrell Dow, “one could reasonably conclude that federal interests are not
sufficiently implicated to justify the assertion of federal jurisdiction unless the actual cause of action is federal”
but arguing that “the Court in Merrell Dow adopted no such rule”); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court:
Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2280–82
(2002) (discussing a split in the courts of appeals about whether a federal right of action is required to create
federal question jurisdiction).
78
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
79
Id. at 805–06.
80
Id. at 812 n.10.
81
545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005).
82
Id. at 310–11.
83
Id. at 311.
84
Id. at 314.
85
Id. at 313.
86
Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)).
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The Court then offered three reasons for upholding federal jurisdiction over
Grable’s quiet title claim. First, “the meaning of the federal statute,” the notice
provision of the tax code, was disputed.87 Second, the dispute over the statute’s
meaning was “an important issue of federal law that sensibly belong[ed] in a
federal court” because of the government’s interest in vindicating its tax
collection activity and because federal judges are experienced with tax law.88
Finally, federal jurisdiction over cases like Grable would not upset any balance
between federal and state judicial responsibilities because, in the Court’s view,
“it will be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal law.”89
One year later, in Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, the
Supreme Court rejected federal jurisdiction over a contract claim brought by
Blue Cross Blue Shield against its insured seeking to recover money the insured
had received in a tort case against a third party.90 The case potentially presented
a federal issue because the insured was an employee of the federal government
and the insurance policy was issued under a master contract between Blue Cross
and the government.91 The Court, however, noted that the case did not fit the
“special and small category” of state-law claims that arise under federal law.92
It distinguished Grable on the ground that “Grable presented a nearly ‘pure issue
of law,’ one ‘that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern
numerous tax sale cases.’”93 By contrast, the claim in Empire was “fact-bound
and situation-specific.”94
Taken together, Merrell Dow, Grable, and Empire make clear that, to justify
federal question jurisdiction over a claim that is not created by federal law, the
federal issue must have wider importance than the case at hand. Those decisions
also hold that arising under jurisdiction does not exist merely because the court
must apply federal law to decide a state-created claim; rather, the case for federal
question jurisdiction is much stronger if the claim presents a pure question of
federal law.

87

Id. at 315.
Id.
89
Id.
90
547 U.S. 677, 683 (2006).
91
Id. at 688–89.
92
Id. at 699.
93
Id. at 700 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHESLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2005)).
94
Id. at 700–01.
88
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B. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction in Patent Cases
As I have explained in a prior article, the Federal Circuit mostly disregarded
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Grable and Empire that case-specific or factspecific federal issues are insufficient to make a case arise under federal law for
jurisdictional purposes.95 Rather, the court held for many years that state law
claims (or claims created by bodies of federal law besides patent law, such as
antitrust law) arose under patent law—and therefore fell within the federal
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction—if the claims implicated
issues about the scope or validity of any particular patent.96 The Federal Circuit
justified this expansive approach to exclusive patent jurisdiction by emphasizing
both the unique experience of federal judges in deciding patent cases and the
overarching importance of uniformity in patent law.97 So, for example, the
Federal Circuit upheld jurisdiction under § 1338 in legal malpractice cases in
which the court would have to decide how issues of infringement or patentability
would have turned out but for an attorney’s negligence.98 The court reached the
same conclusion for other state law tort claims that included embedded issues of
validity or infringement.99 Similarly, state law breach of contract suits would
trigger exclusive jurisdiction if the contract claim turned on the validity or scope
of the licensed patent.100
The Supreme Court rejected this line of Federal Circuit cases in its 2013
decision in Gunn v. Minton.101 In that case, the federal courts had held in patent
infringement litigation that a patent owned by Minton was invalid under the

95

Gugliuzza, supra note 22, at 1815.
See generally Bd. of Regents ex rel. Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 414 F.3d 1358, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court has held that issues of inventorship, infringement, validity and enforceability
present sufficiently substantial questions of federal patent law to support jurisdiction under section 1338(a).”).
97
See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“Claim scope determination is a question of law that can be complex in that it may involve many claim
construction doctrines. Litigants will benefit from federal judges who are used to handling these complicated
rules. Additionally, Congress’ intent to remove non-uniformity in the patent law, as evidenced by its enactment
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 [which created the Federal Circuit], is further indicium that
§ 1338 jurisdiction is proper here.” (citations omitted)).
98
See, e.g., Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (patentability);
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(infringement).
99
See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(upholding § 1338 jurisdiction over a state law claim for injurious falsehood where the allegedly false statements
concerned the validity of a patent); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476,
478 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding § 1338 jurisdiction over a state law claim of business disparagement where the
allegedly disparaging statement was an accusation of patent infringement).
100
See, e.g., U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
101
568 U.S. 251, 263 (2013).
96
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Patent Act’s on-sale bar because Minton leased his invention more than one year
before filing a patent application.102 Minton then sued his attorneys for
malpractice in Texas state court, claiming that the attorneys had been negligent
by not arguing that his patent fell within an exception to the on-sale bar for
experimental uses.103 The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the case dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, relying on the Federal Circuit case law mentioned
above.104
But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, with Chief Justice Roberts’s
unanimous opinion bluntly stating that “state legal malpractice claims based on
underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law.”105
Articulating and applying the four-element test outlined above,106 the Court first
acknowledged that resolution of a federal issue (whether Minton would have
won his patent infringement suit but for his attorneys’ negligence) was both
necessary to and actually disputed within his state-created malpractice claim.107
The Court, however, found that that federal issue was not “substantial” and
therefore did not justify arising under jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized that, to be substantial, a federal issue embedded
within a state law claim must not merely be “significant to the particular parties
in the immediate suit”; rather, “[t]he substantiality inquiry under Grable looks
… to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”108 As
examples of embedded federal questions that are substantial, the Court cited
both Grable, in which the Court had emphasized the federal government’s
“strong interest” in recovering delinquent taxes and in vindicating its own
administrative action, and Smith, where the disputed federal question was the
constitutionality of a statute passed by Congress.109
In Gunn, by contrast, the patent issue raised by Minton’s malpractice
claim—“[i]f Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument,
would the result in the patent infringement proceeding have been different?”—
was entirely “hypothetical” because Minton’s patent had already been
102
Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2006) (on-sale bar).
103
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 255. On the experimental use exception, see generally City of Elizabeth v. Pavement
Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877).
104
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 256 (citing Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld,
L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (2007)).
105
Id. at 258.
106
See supra text accompanying note 73.
107
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 259.
108
Id. at 260.
109
Id. at 260–61.
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invalidated in “real-world” infringement litigation.110 In addition, the Court
rejected Minton’s argument that the preclusive effects of a state court ruling on
a patent issue justified exclusive federal jurisdiction, emphasizing that “the
result would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state
court.”111 “Such ‘fact-bound and situation-specific effects,’” the Court
explained, “are not sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction.”112
II. RISING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION IN
PATENT CASES
The Supreme Court in Gunn appeared to articulate a relatively clear rule
about when a claim that is not created by federal patent law nevertheless arises
under patent law for jurisdictional purposes: The mere need to apply federal
patent law is not sufficient; rather, resolution of the patent issue must have
significant consequences for more than just the parties or the patents involved in
the case.113 Yet the Federal Circuit has struggled to implement the Supreme
Court’s holding. As this Part explains, the Federal Circuit initially tried to limit
Gunn to its precise facts, finding no jurisdiction only when the relevant patent
had already been invalidated or had expired. More recent Federal Circuit
decisions reach results more faithful to the Supreme Court’s holding in Gunn,
but they contain reasoning that is problematic in other ways. This Part critiques
the Federal Circuit’s post-Gunn case law and examines some consequences of
the rising confusion about arising under jurisdiction in patent cases.
A. Undermining the Supreme Court
The Federal Circuit began softening the impact of Gunn in its very first postGunn ruling on subject matter jurisdiction, Forrester Environmental Services,
Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.114 That case, which the Federal Circuit
decided less than three months after Gunn, involved state law tort claims based
on allegedly false accusations of patent infringement.115 The Federal Circuit
ultimately held that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the accusations
concerned conduct that took place entirely in Taiwan, where the relevant U.S.

110

Id. at 261.
Id. at 263.
112
Id. (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006)).
113
See, e.g., id. at 263–64 (ruling that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the effects of the case
“would be limited to the parties and patents that [were] before the … court” and would not create “binding
precedent for any future patent claim”).
114
715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
115
Id. at 1332.
111
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patents could not possibly be infringed.116 Nevertheless, the court, in an opinion
by Judge Dyk, used the opportunity to pen dicta distinguishing Gunn from its
older case law. The court discussed several pre-Gunn (indeed, pre-Grable)
Federal Circuit decisions upholding jurisdiction over state law tort claims that
contained embedded issues of patent validity or infringement117 and observed
that those decisions “may well have survived the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gunn.”118 The Federal Circuit elaborated:
Unlike the purely “backward-looking” legal malpractice claim in
Gunn, permitting state courts to adjudicate disparagement cases (involving alleged false statements about U.S. patent rights) could result
in inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts. For example, a federal court could conclude that certain conduct constituted infringement of a patent while a state court addressing the same infringement question could conclude that the accusation of infringement was
false and the patentee could be enjoined from making future public
claims about the full scope of its patent as construed in federal court.119

The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in this passage both misunderstands how the
law of issue preclusion operates and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gunn. In terms of preclusion, the Federal Circuit’s opinion
significantly overstates the possibility of inconsistent rulings if state courts were
to adjudicate tort claims involving false accusations of patent infringement.
Contrary to what the Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests, a federal court’s finding
of infringement (or, for that matter, any other finding made by the federal court)
would prevent the parties from relitigating that same issue in state court. Under
the doctrine of issue preclusion, the parties to a case are prohibited from
relitigating any issue decided in that case. The preclusive effect of federal court
rulings in federal question cases is determined by federal law,120 and federal
preclusion law would plainly prohibit relitigation of the same issue of
infringement or validity between the same parties,121 including in a later state
law tort case.122
116

Id. at 1334–35.
Id. at 1334 (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329–31 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
118
Id.
119
Id. (citation omitted).
120
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008).
121
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1311–
12 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
122
Though there is little case law on the specific question of the preclusive effect of federal patent rulings
in later state court litigation, “it is clear that federal judgments must be afforded full faith and credit by the state
courts.” Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1357 n.129 (1977)
(citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938)).
117
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The converse is also true. If a state court first ruled that an allegation of
infringement was false, that ruling would almost certainly prevent the same
parties from relitigating the infringement issue in subsequent federal
litigation.123 Though it might seem odd at first glance to give a state court the
first—and last—word on an issue of federal patent law, it is not at all unusual
for federal courts to grant preclusive effect to state court judgments on matters
of federal law more generally.124
Even if preclusion law would not prevent conflicting judgments between
state and federal courts in patent-related state law cases (which, as I have just
argued, it generally does), the Forrester opinion still flouted the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gunn by suggesting that case-specific concerns about
inconsistent rulings would justify exclusive federal jurisdiction. As the Supreme
Court instructed, in determining whether a federal issue embedded within a
state-created claim is “substantial,” courts should not “focus[] on the importance
of the issue to the plaintiff’s case and to the parties before it” because the federal
issue will always be significant to the parties.125 Rather, the Court instructed,
“[t]he substantiality inquiry … looks … to the importance of the issue to the
federal system as a whole.”126 It is simply not clear how different rulings about
the validity or infringement of one particular patent could meet that standard. As
the Supreme Court noted in finding federal jurisdiction lacking in Gunn, the
effect of any ruling on the validity of Minton’s patent would have been “limited
to the parties and patents that [were] before the state court.”127
Despite these flaws in the Forrester dicta, the Federal Circuit, in its next
encounter with subject matter jurisdiction, squarely held that case- and party123
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to
give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments
emerged would do so….”) (citing the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
124
See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (holding that a state court judgment
affirming the denial of a federal Title VII claim precluded the claimant from bringing a federal lawsuit to
relitigate the liability determination).
125
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 263. Though the Supreme Court has often touted the public interest in policing the scope and
validity of issued patents, see, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971),
that societal interest in “full and free competition in the use of ideas,” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670
(1969), is not the same as the federal interest needed to trigger jurisdiction under cases such as Grable. The
public interest in reviewing patent validity or scope could be vindicated even if the federal courts did not exist
or did not have jurisdiction over patent cases. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–71 (weighing the
costs and benefits of repealing the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases). Jurisdictiontriggering federal interests typically arise in disputes about the constitutionality or meaning of federal law, or in
challenges to the legality of the federal government’s own actions, as the Grable and Gunn cases themselves
illustrate.
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specific issues of patent infringement and validity are sufficient for a case to
arise under federal patent law. In Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., the plaintiff
filed a breach of contract suit in federal court seeking to recover unpaid royalties
under a patent licensing agreement.128 The district court denied the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the merits of the claim but gave the defendants
permission to seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).129 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit, before addressing the defendants’ § 1292(b) request
(which it ultimately denied),130 first confronted the issue of jurisdiction. Because
the case indisputably qualified for diversity jurisdiction, the question before the
Federal Circuit was not whether the case could proceed in federal court at all
(which was the question in both Gunn and Forrester), it was whether the Federal
Circuit should decide the case or whether the case should be transferred to the
relevant regional circuit (in Jang, the Ninth Circuit).131 Recall, however, that the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute (§ 1295(a)(1)) and the statute conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on the district courts (§ 1338(a)) ask precisely the same
question: Does the case “arise under” patent law?132
The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Linn, distinguished Gunn and
held that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the Jang case. Unlike in Gunn, the
court asserted, “the disputed federal patent law issues presented … are
substantial and neither entirely backward-looking nor hypothetical.”133 These
patent issues, according to the court, included not only the question of
infringement (that is, whether the defendants were selling products covered by
Jang’s patents without paying royalties) but also validity, as the licensing
contract required the defendants to pay royalties only on products covered by
“valid” claims of the licensed patents.134 In Jang, unlike in Gunn, the relevant
patents were apparently still enforceable,135 and, in upholding jurisdiction, the
128

767 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1336. Section 1292(b) allows a district judge, when entering an order that is not otherwise
appealable, to authorize the parties to seek interlocutory review if the order “involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and “an immediate appeal … may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). The court of appeals
has discretion as to whether or not to allow an appeal to proceed. Id.
130
Jang, 767 F.3d at 1339.
131
See id. at 1335.
132
28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2012).
133
Jang, 767 F.3d at 1337.
134
Id.
135
In reality, by the time of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the patents had been canceled in reexamination
proceedings at the Patent Office. See id. at 1338. But the Federal Circuit treated the patents as if they were still
in force for jurisdictional purposes because (1) issues of infringement or validity could still be raised in
subsequent suits to recover unpaid royalties for the time period before the patents were canceled, see id. at 1337–
38, and (2) the court viewed subject matter jurisdiction as properly determined “on the facts as they existed at
129
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Federal Circuit put significant emphasis on how the court’s ruling in the breach
of contract case might impact “subsequently arising infringement suits affecting
other parties.”136 Repeating the dicta from Forrester that I quoted above, the
Federal Circuit stressed the “potential of conflicting rulings particularly as to
validity” between a regional circuit and the Federal Circuit should the breach of
contract case not be appealed to the Federal Circuit.137 This potential for
“inconsistent judgments,” the court explained, would affect “not only the parties
to this dispute but other parties who might be sued in separate actions for
infringement.”138 Accordingly, the court concluded, “[m]aintaining Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over … contractual disputes to avoid such conflicting rulings
is important to ‘the federal system as a whole’ and not merely ‘to the particular
parties in the immediate suit.’”139
Like the dicta in Forrester, the holding in Jang evidences misunderstanding
of the law of preclusion and ignores the Supreme Court’s holding in Gunn that
case- and fact-specific issues are insufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction.
In terms of preclusion, it is easiest to understand the Federal Circuit’s mistake
by considering the four possible ways in which the court hearing the breach of
contract suit might resolve the embedded issues of patent infringement or
validity (or both). In each circumstance, the Federal Circuit’s assertion that
exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction is needed to prevent conflicting
outcomes is either (a) wrong because preclusion law would prevent conflicting
outcomes regardless of which court decided the case or, (b) to the extent
preclusion law would not prevent conflicting outcomes, exaggerates the degree
to which exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction could do that work
instead.
The first outcome the court hearing the breach of contract suit could reach is
that the patent is invalid (meaning that the defendant does not owe royalties
under the contract). It is black-letter law (dating back to the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Blonder-Tongue140) that a ruling of patent invalidity may be
invoked defensively to avoid liability by anyone accused in the future of
infringing that patent, regardless of whether that accused infringer was a party
to the original suit. Importantly, that would not change simply because the issue

the time the claim was filed,” id. at 1338 (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004)
(a diversity case involving post-filing changes in citizenship)).
136
Id. at 1337.
137
See id. at 1338.
138
Id.
139
Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013)).
140
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
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of patent validity was decided in the context of a breach of contract claim rather
than as a defense to an infringement claim. Under the federal law of issue
preclusion, defendants have a broad ability to rely on rulings from a prior case
against a party who litigated and lost that prior case. The relevant doctrine
requires only that the two cases present the same issue and that that issue was
actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior case.141 A ruling that no
breach of contract occurred because the licensed patent is invalid plainly meets
those requirements. Thus, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s suggestion, there is
no danger of conflicting rulings when the court hearing the breach of contract
case holds that the patent is invalid: that invalidity ruling will, under BlonderTongue, control the result in any future infringement litigation, regardless of
which court decides the breach of contract case.142
Second, the court hearing the breach of contract case could conclude that the
patent is not invalid (meaning that the defendant does owe royalties if its
products do, in fact, infringe—the fourth possibility discussed below). In the
circumstance in which the court hearing the contract case rejects the defendant’s
assertion of invalidity, it is possible that a court hearing a future infringement
141

Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
The only possible exception is if the court hearing the breach of contract case is a state court in the
small minority of states that have not followed Blonder-Tongue’s relaxation of the mutuality requirement for the
defensive use of issue preclusion. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994); E.C. v. Katz, 731
So. 2d 1268, 1269–70 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam); Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 298 (Mich.
1990); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 385–86 (N.D. 1992); see also Farred v.
Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Georgia law). Also, it is possible that the Patent Office
might not treat a state court invalidity ruling as preclusive in post-issuance proceedings to review patent validity.
Cf. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263 (noting that “[t]he Patent and Trademark Office Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure provides that res judicata is a proper ground for rejecting a patent ‘only when the earlier decision was
a decision of the Board of Appeals’ or certain federal reviewing courts, giving no indication that state court
decisions would have preclusive effect” (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(w) (8th
ed. Aug. 2012 rev.))). But the legal basis for the Patent Office ignoring a final state court judgment finding a
patent to be invalid would be far from clear. Cf. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“[I]f a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may
discontinue its reexamination…. [I]t is admissible for the PTO to act on [a] standing judgment of invalidity
unless and until a court has said it does not have res judicata effect.”). In an opinion issued as this Article was
going to press, the Federal Circuit suggested that it, too, might refuse to follow a state court decision finding that
a patent does not meet the validity requirements set by federal law. In Inspired Development Group, LLC v.
Inspired Products Group, LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the court—in tension with Forrester and
Jang—declined jurisdiction over a state law case containing an embedded issue of patent validity because it
viewed “[t]he risk of” conflicting state-federal rulings on patent validity to be “remote,” noting that “a state court
cannot invalidate patents.” But federal courts, contrary to what the Federal Circuit seems to be implying, do not
“invalidate” patents, either. Rather, their judgments finding that patents do not meet validity requirements are
given defensive, non-mutual preclusive effect in future litigation under Blonder-Tongue. Importantly, the
relevant state and federal laws of preclusion are relatively similar, meaning that a state court judgment finding
that a patent does not meet validity requirements ought to be given preclusive effect in a federal court. See supra
notes 123-124.
142
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dispute could reach a different result and hold the patent to be invalid. Unlike an
accused infringer, who may invoke a prior ruling of invalidity defensively under
Blonder-Tongue even if they were not a party to the prior case, a patentee may
not offensively rely on a ruling finding its patent not invalid to preclude future
litigation of validity by parties who were not involved in the prior dispute.143
This is because due process principles strictly limit the use of preclusion against
litigants who were not parties to a prior case.144
Importantly, however, this possibility of different validity rulings is in no
way unique to cases involving state law claims (or non-patent federal claims,
such as antitrust claims) with patent validity issues embedded in them. Rather,
it exists any time a patentee sues multiple defendants seriatim. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit itself has approved of different rulings on the validity of a single
patent in serial infringement suits, reasoning that different courts can properly
reach different results because of different evidentiary records and different prior
art references presented in different cases.145
Moreover, when the Federal Circuit in Jang wrote of the possibility of
“conflicting” rulings on patent validity,146 it was arguably overstating matters.
As the Federal Circuit itself has recognized:
[A] prior holding of validity is not necessarily inconsistent with [a]
subsequent holding of invalidity. In one action, the defendants did not
overcome the statutory presumption of validity; in the other they did.
The difference in result could be attributable to many neutral facts:
e.g., different prior art references or different records. It cannot always
be said that of two “inconsistent” determinations, one is correct and
one is incorrect.147

Thus, whether or not exclusive federal (or Federal Circuit) jurisdiction exists
over breach of contract cases like Jang, the possibility of different rulings on the
validity of a single patent will remain when the first court to pass on the issue
finds that the patent is not invalid.
Third, the court hearing the breach of contract claim could conclude that the
defendant does not infringe the patent (that is, that the products the defendant is

143

See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1256 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008).
145
See, e.g., Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Allen
Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[W]e shall review the district
court’s conclusion on validity in this case independently” despite a prior judgment upholding validity).
146
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
147
Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
144
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selling are not covered by the plaintiff’s patent and hence do not trigger any
contractual obligation to pay royalties). In that circumstance, there is no danger
of conflicting rulings between the same parties because the doctrine of issue
preclusion would plainly prohibit the parties from relitigating the same issue of
infringement in a subsequent suit.148 And despite a finding of noninfringement
in the first, breach of contract, case, the patentee will be allowed to file future
infringement suits against different defendants. The patentee could succeed in
those later suits, but that result would be unremarkable. In most circumstances,
the new defendant’s accused product or process will differ from the original
defendant’s and will therefore present unique factual questions that would
justify a different outcome.
Finally, the court hearing the breach of contract suit could conclude that the
patent is not invalid and that the defendant does infringe it. In that circumstance,
too, exclusive jurisdiction would do nothing to reduce the danger of divergent
results. The patentee would, as usual, be free to file future infringement suits
against different accused infringers. And any subsequent accused infringer
would have a due process right to litigate the issue of validity for itself.149 None
of that changes based on whether the first, breach of contract, suit is litigated in
state or federal court or is appealed to the Federal Circuit or one of the regional
circuits.
Moreover, even if exclusive jurisdiction would help ensure consistent
rulings from one case to another, as the court in Jang (wrongly) asserted,150 that
is a case-specific, patent-specific, and party-specific consistency that the
Supreme Court in Gunn indicated was insufficient to trigger arising under
jurisdiction.151 In a case like Jang, there is no danger that different courts will
“undermine the ‘development of a uniform body of [patent] law.’”152 The key
issues in determining whether the defendants breached the licensing contract
involve the validity and scope of particular patents. Those issues are a far cry
from the embedded questions of federal law that justified jurisdiction in Smith
(was the federal Farm Loan Act constitutional?)153 and Grable (what does the
federal tax code mean when it requires the government to give a taxpayer

148

See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144.
150
Jang, 767 F.3d at 1338.
151
See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 263–64 (2013).
152
Id. at 261 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)) (alteration
in original) (emphasis added).
153
Smith v. Kan. City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921).
149
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“notice” of its seizure of the taxpayer’s property?).154 Indeed, as the Supreme
Court instructed in Grable, its recent precedent has confined arising under
jurisdiction over state law claims to those that “really and substantially involv[e]
a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of
[federal] law.”155
Despite these flaws, the Federal Circuit has continued to reassert its holding
in Jang that case-specific issues of patent infringement or validity trigger arising
under jurisdiction any time the relevant patents might be asserted in future
infringement litigation (unlike in Gunn where the relevant patent had already
been invalidated). Most notably, in Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Wok & Pan,
Ind., Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a state law
tortious interference claim for lack of personal jurisdiction but suggested in dicta
that exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction probably existed.156 The court,
in another opinion by Judge Dyk (the author of Forrester, which also contained
questionable dicta about the scope of the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction over patent cases post-Gunn), reasoned that, because the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had engaged in “unfounded” patent infringement
litigation, the plaintiff would have to prove noninfringment or invalidity of the
defendant’s patents to succeed on its state law claim.157 A state court ruling on
those (case-specific) issues, the Federal Circuit (incorrectly) claimed, raised the
“potential for ‘inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts,’”
justifying jurisdiction under § 1338(a).158
B. Confusion and Its Consequences
Most observers outside the sometimes-hermetic sphere of patent law would
probably be surprised to learn about the expansive conception of arising under
jurisdiction espoused by the Federal Circuit in Forrester, Jang, and Maxchief.
In fact, the leading textbook on the law of federal jurisdiction presumes that, in
a case like Jang that involves a claim for breach of a patent license agreement,
precisely the opposite result will prevail. The authors do not mention Jang, but
they offer the following example that parallels the facts of that case, and they

154
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue, 545 U.S. 308, 310–11 (2005); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a)
(2012) (notice requirement).
155
Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
156
909 F.3d 1134, 1140 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
157
Id.
158
Id. (quoting Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2013)).
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conclude—contrary to the Federal Circuit—that arising under jurisdiction would
not exist:
Suppose … that a plaintiff sues a non-diverse party for breach of the
defendant’s promise to pay royalties in exchange for a patent license;
the defendant concedes the failure to pay but defends on the ground
that the patent is invalid and as a result the promise is unenforceable.
Although the case will turn exclusively on the federal issue of patent
validity, that issue will be litigated entirely in state court.159

In fact, the Federal Circuit’s holding that case-specific issues of patent
infringement or validity cause a case to arise under patent law conflicts not just
with the views of leading commentators, it conflicts with both regional circuit
case law and subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit itself.
As for regional circuit case law, the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that, even
after Gunn, embedded issues of patent infringement or validity can create arising
under jurisdiction is most clearly in tension with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. RAD Source Technologies, Inc.160 That case, which
was decided after Gunn but before Jang,161 involved claims that the defendant
had breached a contract that prohibited it from developing technology that was
“embodie[d], in whole or in part,” in certain patents.162 Thus, to succeed on its
breach of contract claim, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant infringed
the patents.163 The Eleventh Circuit found this question of patent law insufficient
to warrant Federal Circuit jurisdiction on appeal164 because patent infringement
is a question that is “heavily ‘fact-bound and situation-specific.’”165 Because of
the “highly specialized nature of patent claims and the niche market for” the
technology at issue, the Eleventh Circuit observed, resolution of this issue of
infringement was unlikely to affect any future cases.166 Distinguishing Grable
and the importance to the federal government of having its tax collection
activities vindicated by a federal court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “the
government interest in any particular fact-bound question of patent infringement
is less significant than the government interest in a question of law that will

159
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 812 (7th ed. 2015) (emphasis added).
160
720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013).
161
Though the cases present similar facts, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Jang did not mention the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in MDS, perhaps because the two opinions are difficult to reconcile, as I explain here.
162
Id. at 841.
163
Id. at 841–42.
164
Id. at 843. The district court indisputably had jurisdiction under the diversity statute. Id. at 841.
165
Id. at 842 (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006)).
166
Id.
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impact the ability of the government to raise revenue in a number of future
cases.”167 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that finding that the breach of
contract case arose under patent law because it implicated issues of patent
infringement would “upset the ‘congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.’ To hold that all questions of patent infringement
are substantial questions of federal law for the purposes of federal patent
jurisdiction would sweep a number of state-law claims into federal court.”168
The only possible distinction between MDS and the Federal Circuit’s
decisions in Forrester, Jang, and Maxchief is that, in MDS, one of the relevant
patents had expired because the patentee failed to pay maintenance fees.169 But
other licensed patents in MDS remained in force.170 Moreover, for reasons I have
already explained, an interpretation of Gunn that finds jurisdiction lacking only
when the underlying patent has already been invalidated or expired or is no
longer enforceable is flawed because it puts too much weight on the significance
of the case to parties at hand and it ignores the lack of significance of the case
to the federal system as a whole.171
Separate and apart from the potential inconsistency of Federal Circuit law
with regional circuit law, Federal Circuit law on arising under jurisdiction is now
internally inconsistent. In its most recent significant encounter with issues of
subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit held, in contrast to Jang and the
other cases discussed above, that a case-specific issue of patent validity was not
sufficient to make a federal antitrust claim arise under patent law.
In that case, Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., the plaintiff’s complaint,
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, asserted a single
claim: that the defendant violated federal antitrust law by filing suit for
infringement of a patent it had obtained through fraud on the Patent Office.172
The Supreme Court, in its seminal 1965 decision in Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Co., held that enforcing a patent obtained
via fraud violates the federal antitrust laws, provided the plaintiff can prove the
167

Id.
Id. at 843 (internal citations omitted).
169
Id. at 840; see also Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing MDS as having
ruled that “the question of infringement was not substantial because the patent had expired”).
170
See MDS (Can.), Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1312–13 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(determining that the licensor’s failure to pay maintenance fees was not a material breach of the licensing
agreement because another one of the licensed patents “provide[d] sufficient protection for the blood irradiation
technology” manufactured by the licensee).
171
See supra Part II.A.
172
882 F.3d 1075, 1078, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
168
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other elements of an antitrust claim, such as the defendant’s monopoly power in
a relevant market.173 The federal district court in Xitronix granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Walker Process claim, ruling
that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine factual dispute both about whether the
defendant had defrauded the Patent Office and whether any misrepresentations
had caused the Patent Office to issue the patent.174
The defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit
transferred the case to the Fifth Circuit, concluding that the plaintiff’s Walker
Process claim did not raise a “substantial” question of patent law under Gunn.175
The Federal Circuit offered three main reasons for finding a lack of
substantiality, but all of those reasons are problematic in light of the court’s prior
precedent (Jang, most notably) and the reality of what litigation of a Walker
Process claim entails.
The first reason the court gave for finding that the patent issues in Xitronix
were not substantial was that, although the Walker Process claim turned on
whether the defendant had made false statements to the Patent Office, “[t]here
is nothing unique to patent law about allegations of false statements.”176 Yet
whether a case presents issues “unique to patent law” is, quite simply, not the
test for determining whether a case arises under patent law for jurisdictional
purposes.177 The question of whether an issue is unique to patent law is, instead,
one formulation of the test the Federal Circuit has used to make choice of law
rulings—specifically, to determine whether an issue of non-patent law (such as
a procedural question or a question of substantive law outside the field of patent
law) should be governed by Federal Circuit precedent or by the precedent of the
regional circuit encompassing the district court.178 But just because Federal
Circuit law does not apply to a particular issue does not mean that the Federal
Circuit lacks jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, many issues that frequently arise
in cases over which the Federal Circuit indisputably has jurisdiction are—to the

173

382 U.S. 172, 176–77 (1965).
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., No. A-14-CA-01113-SS, 2016 WL 7626575, at *9 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2016).
175
Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078, 1080.
176
Id. at 1077.
177
Oddly, just a paragraph earlier, the court had correctly recited the jurisdictional standard by asking
whether the Walker Process claim “necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal
patent law.” Id. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
178
See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (“We, therefore, rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal Circuit shall review procedural matters, that
are not unique to patent issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the
district court would normally lie.”).
174
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chagrin of many observers179—not actually governed by Federal Circuit law.180
Thus, whether or not issues of fraud on the Patent Office are “unique” to patent
law does not answer the question of which court—state or federal, or, as in
Xitronix, the Federal Circuit or a regional circuit—has jurisdiction.181
The second reason the Federal Circuit gave in Xitronix for finding a lack of
substantiality was the case-specific nature of the patent questions raised.182 After
asserting that the allegations of fraud were not “unique to patent law,” the court
acknowledged that determining whether the defendant made misrepresentations
to the Patent Office “will almost certainly require some application of patent
law.”183 For instance, analyzing whether fraud occurred “may require analysis
of the [patent’s] claims and specifications and may require application of patent
claim construction principles.”184 Though the Federal Circuit did not mention it,
a Walker Process claim also requires the court to determine the effect that any
misrepresentations had on the patent examiner, as the Supreme Court’s Walker
Process decision requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s
misrepresentations caused the Patent Office to issue the patent.185
In any event, the Federal Circuit in Xitronix wrote that jurisdiction was
lacking because the Supreme Court in Gunn required “something more” than
“mere resolution of a patent issue in a ‘case within a case’” to trigger arising
under jurisdiction.186 As my analysis above suggests, this interpretation of Gunn
is correct. A case-specific, patent-specific analysis of claim scope or
infringement, or of how specific misrepresentations affected an examiner’s
179
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v.
Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1577 (2016) (describing problems that have
occurred because the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to copyright issues); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal
Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1996) (arguing that
the Federal Circuit’s reticence to apply its own law to nonpatent substantive issues “inhibits the court’s ability
to provide uniform guidance to patent policy and the patent-related business activities of litigants”).
180
See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters
in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 653–68 (2009) (also noting inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s
choice-of-law precedent).
181
Moreover, and in any event, Federal Circuit precedent clearly holds that the fraud element of a Walker
Process claim is an issue unique to patent cases and is therefore governed by Federal Circuit precedent. See
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067–68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant
part) (“Whether conduct in the prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the
antitrust laws is one of those issues that clearly involves our exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases…. Because
most cases involving these issues will therefore be appealed to this court, we conclude that we should decide
these issues as a matter of Federal Circuit law, rather than rely on various regional precedents.”).
182
Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078.
183
Id. at 1077–78.
184
Id. at 1078.
185
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
186
Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted).
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analysis of patentability, are not sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction,
even in a case like Xitronix in which the patent might still be enforced in the
future. But the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Xitronix is inconsistent with the
court’s prior decision in Jang, which held that issues of patent infringement or
validity embedded within a state law breach of contract claim were sufficient to
make a case arise under patent law for jurisdictional purposes.187
The final reason the Federal Circuit gave for finding a lack of substantiality
in Xitronix—in a possible effort to distinguish Jang—was that the Xitronix case
presented “no dispute over the validity” of the plaintiff’s patent.188 But Xitronix
did effectively involve a question of patent validity. A finding in the antitrust
litigation that the defendant had obtained its patent through fraud on the Patent
Office would almost certainly cause the patent to be found unenforceable in any
future infringement litigation under patent law’s doctrine of inequitable conduct,
which prohibits a patentee from enforcing a patent that it obtained through
intentional misrepresentations to the Patent Office.189 As the Fifth Circuit
observed in a subsequent appeal in the Xitronix litigation: “[I]f this litigation
determines that the [defendant/patentee] defrauded the PTO in obtaining the …
patent, collateral estoppel principles would furnish a readymade inequitable
conduct defense to any potential infringer whom [the patentee] might sue.”190
Though inequitable conduct is technically a ground of patent unenforceability,
not validity, the salient point is that a finding of fraud in the Walker Process case
would give rise to a near-locktight inequitable conduct defense, which would
bar a future infringement claim—just like a ruling of patent invalidity would
under Blonder-Tongue. So, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s assertion, the
validity of the patent effectively was at issue in Xitronix, again making the case
indistinguishable from—and in conflict with—Jang.191
187
See Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting with approval the Federal
Circuit’s opinion upholding jurisdiction in a prior appeal in the same litigation: “In previously ruling that this
court had jurisdiction over Jang’s appeal, we noted that ‘[a]lthough this case arises from a contract claim, rather
than directly as a patent infringement claim, Jang’s right to relief on the contract claim as asserted in the
complaint depends on an issue of federal patent law—whether the stents sold by [the defendants] would have
infringed [Jang’s patents].’ Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn alters that conclusion.” (quoting
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted))).
188
Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1078. Recall that the contract in Jang obligated the defendants to pay royalties
only on products covered by “valid” patent. Jang, 767 F.3d at 1337.
189
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1290–92 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
190
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019 WL
4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); see also TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1307 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“After Therasense, the showing required for proving inequitable conduct and the showing required
for proving the fraud component of Walker Process liability may be nearly identical.”).
191
For this reason, the Federal Circuit was incorrect to analogize the Xitronix case to a recent D.C. Circuit
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The defendant in Xitronix sought rehearing en banc in the Federal Circuit,
but the court denied the petition by a vote of ten to two.192 Only Judges Newman
and Lourie voted to rehear the case.193 And only Judge Newman filed an opinion
explaining her rationale. That opinion pointed out many of the flaws in the
panel’s decision that I identified above. She observed that the plaintiff’s Walker
Process claim necessarily raised an issue about the enforceability of the
underlying patent,194 and she noted that the panel’s decision was inconsistent
with circuit precedent, including Jang.195 Ultimately, however, Judge
Newman’s opinion embraced the flawed view that case-specific issues of
validity or enforceability that merely require applying patent law are sufficient
to trigger arising under jurisdiction.196
Despite Judge Newman’s dissent, the Xitronix case next landed in the Fifth
Circuit. Remarkably, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide the case and sent it back
to the Federal Circuit.197 Though the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized several
errors in the Federal Circuit panel’s opinion, the court made some errors of its
own. And it certainly did not make the case that the Federal Circuit’s decision
finding that it lacked jurisdiction was so “clearly erroneous” or “implausible” as
to warrant sending the parties back to the Federal Circuit for yet another round
of appellate litigation.198
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by examining the Federal Circuit’s preGunn case law, which it understood to hold that “the determination of fraud
before the PTO necessarily involves a substantial question of patent law.”199
decision exercising jurisdiction over a malpractice claim alleging that the defendants had engaged in negligence
during patent prosecution, Seed Co. v. Westerman, 832 F.3d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In that decision, the
basis for the D.C. Circuit exercising jurisdiction was that the case, “like Gunn, involve[d] no forward-looking
questions about any patent’s validity” because the patent never actually issued. Id. Xitronix, by contrast, did
involve questions that would affect the patent’s enforceability going forward.
192
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“The panel states
that Gunn requires moving the appeal to the Fifth Circuit because in the case at bar ‘[t]here is no dispute over
the validity of claims.’ This is a puzzling statement, for that is the dispute: Xitronix states that a finding of fraud
or inequitable conduct will ‘result in the … patent claims being rendered collaterally invalid and/or
unenforceable.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed.
Cir. 2018))).
195
Id. at 1200.
196
See id. at 1196 (“If the issues of inequitable conduct or fraud in procuring [a] patent are no longer
deemed to be a substantial issue of patent law, the court should speak en banc.”).
197
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2019).
198
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819 (1988) (holding that a transferee
court should accept jurisdiction over a patent appeal so long as the transfer decision is “plausible” and not
“clearly erroneous” (citation omitted)).
199
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,

GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19

492

12/9/2019 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:459

After summarizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn, the Fifth Circuit
asserted that the Federal Circuit’s “reasoning [in its transfer decision] depended
on several premises that we find implausible.”200 First, the Fifth Circuit noted,
“[a] finding of fraud on the PTO would,” in fact, “render [the] patent effectively
unenforceable in future cases,” strengthening the case that the federal question
embedded in the plaintiff’s Walker Process claim is “substantial.”201 Consistent
with my argument above, the Fifth Circuit’s statement is correct as a matter of
preclusion doctrine. But, as I have also argued, the potential unenforceability of
one particular patent is too case-specific to satisfy Gunn’s requirement that the
embedded issue of patent law be significant to the federal system as a whole.
Second, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit for distinguishing
prior Federal Circuit decisions holding that Walker Process claims are governed
by Federal Circuit precedent, not regional circuit precedent.202 In Xitronix, the
Federal Circuit had reasoned that its precedent on choice of law did not mandate
that it accept jurisdiction.203 Yet the Fifth Circuit wrote that the distinction
between jurisdiction and choice of law “strikes us as immaterial. The tests for
both questions turn on the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over a given
issue.”204 This statement reflects a misunderstanding of Federal Circuit choiceof-law doctrine. As explained above, for better or worse, the scope of Federal
Circuit law is not coextensive with the scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction.205
Thus, cases about whether Federal Circuit law applies to a given issue do not
answer the question of whether a particular case falls within the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit’s reliance on
precedent from outside the Federal Circuit in declining jurisdiction.206 Yet some
aspects of the Fifth Circuit’s criticism are overblown. For instance, the Fifth
Circuit chastised the Federal Circuit for citing a Third Circuit decision, In re
Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, in which the Third Circuit exercised jurisdiction
over a patent-related antitrust claim that asserted Walker Process fraud as one

1330 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). This line of case law, it is worth noting, is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
general pre-Gunn view, discussed above, that the mere need to apply patent law was sufficient to create arising
under jurisdiction over cases involving non-patent claims. See supra Part I.B.
200
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 438–39.
201
Id. at 439 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
202
Id. (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
203
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
204
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439.
205
See supra notes 179–81.
206
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439–40.

GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19

2019]

12/9/2019 12:01 PM

JURISDICTION IN PATENT CASES

493

of many theories of antitrust liability.207 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Lipitor
case involved “non-patent antitrust theories,” so it “clearly” belonged in the
regional circuit.208 While that is an accurate description of the Lipitor case, the
Third Circuit’s opinion in that case also reviewed the Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn
Walker Process case law as well as the Gunn decision itself and observed that,
after Gunn, a claim of Walker Process fraud might no longer be a “substantial”
question of federal law sufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction.209 And the
Federal Circuit in Xitronix relied on Lipitor for nothing more than the Third
Circuit’s passing statement that the validity of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Gunn
case law on jurisdiction over Walker Process claims “may be open to debate
following Gunn.”210
Also, the Fifth Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit for relying on a prior
Fifth Circuit decision, USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,211 which the
Federal Circuit viewed as evidence that the Fifth Circuit had previously been
willing to decide “a state law claim based on fraud on the PTO because the
underlying fraud allegation ‘d[id] not cause the underlying hypothetical patent
issues to be of substantial importance to the federal system as a whole.’”212 The
Fifth Circuit was correct to note that USPPS did not, in fact, involve a claim of
fraud on the Patent Office; it actually involved fraud claims against a business
and its lawyers following a failed patent application.213 But the Fifth Circuit’s
ultimate holding in USPPS is directly on point. In that case, the plaintiff “could
not prove causation without proving the patentability of its invention.”214 Thus,
USPPS—just like Xitronix—required an analysis of patentability. Yet the Fifth
Circuit nevertheless exercised jurisdiction in USPPS because “[t]he hypothetical
patent issues between the parties … [were] fact-specific and of no importance to
the federal system”215—a result that is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
ruling in Xitronix declining jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, under Gunn, the federal
question in Xitronix was indeed substantial. The court analogized the case to

207
855 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2017). Other theories included the defendants’ filing of a sham citizen
petition with the Food and Drug Administration and the defendants’ entry into a reverse payment settlement of
patent litigation. Id.
208
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 439–40.
209
See Lipitor, 855 F.3d at 146.
210
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
211
541 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2013).
212
Xitronix, 882 F.3d at 1080 (quoting USPPS, 541 F. App’x at 390).
213
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 440.
214
USPPS, 541 F. App’x at 389.
215
Id. at 390.
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Grable and Smith, asserting that it turned on “the legality of a federal action.”216
In Grable, the federal question was whether the government had lawfully seized
land to satisfy a tax delinquency.217 In Smith, the question was whether Congress
had acted constitutionally when it passed the Farm Loan Act.218 In Xitronix, the
question, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, was whether the Patent Office had properly
issued a patent.219
But that, too, is an overstatement. The federal question in Xitronix is not
about whether the government acted legally, it is about whether the patentee
fraudulently goaded the Patent Office into issuing a patent. This focus on the
legality of actions by a private party—not the federal government—
distinguishes Xitronix from Grable and Smith. Moreover, in both Grable and
Smith, the determination of whether the government had acted lawfully would
have clear implications for future cases. In Grable, a decision about whether the
taxpayer received adequate notice would set precedent about the meaning of
“notice” in the tax statute that would apply in any other dispute involving that
statute.220 In Smith, the decision on whether the Farm Loan Act was
constitutional would dictate the validity of bonds that were owned by numerous
different persons and corporations and that were issued by dozens of banks that
were owned at least in part by the federal government.221 In addition, the Smith
case would (and did) set important precedent about Congress’s power under the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.222 In a case like Xitronix, by contrast, the
enforceability of the patent in suit is relevant only to the parties to the case and,
perhaps, to the small number of persons who might be accused of infringing that
patent in the future. Either way, the effects of the determination of patent
enforceability “would be limited to the parties and patents … before the …
court”223—precisely the type of effects the Supreme Court in Gunn ruled were
insufficient to establish arising under jurisdiction.
It is possible, as the Fifth Circuit noted in Xitronix, that the court’s resolution

216
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441 (“This litigation has the potential to render [the] patent effectively
unenforceable and to declare the PTO proceeding tainted by illegality.”).
217
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005).
218
Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921).
219
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441.
220
See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311 (2005).
221
See Smith, 255 U.S. at 196; see also Larry Yackle, Federal Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the
Progressive Era: A Case Study of Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co., 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 255, 274 (2013) (noting
that the mere filing of “the constitutional challenge in Smith wrecked the rural financial system established by
the Act”).
222
Smith, 255 U.S. at 211.
223
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 263 (2013).
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of the Walker Process claim could “set precedent” about the scope of patent
practitioners’ duty of candor to the Patent Office.224 But the mere possibility
that, by applying the law to the facts of the case, a court might set precedent
about a patent-related matter also does not seem sufficient to create arising under
jurisdiction under Gunn. After all, in Gunn, if the court hearing the malpractice
case determined that the patentee would have won his infringement suit because
the experimental use exception did, in fact, apply, that ruling would stand as
precedent about the contours of the experimental use doctrine. But, despite the
precedent-creating potential of a federal decision, the Supreme Court in Gunn
found federal jurisdiction lacking.225 Thus, the Fifth Circuit was wrong to assert
that adjudication of a case-specific patent issue must be done exclusively in
federal court (and in the Federal Circuit) simply because it might set precedent
about a patent-related matter. Indeed, the leading treatise on federal jurisdiction
notes that one consequence of Gunn is that “the standards of practice before a
federal administrative agency (the Patent and Trademark Office) and the federal
courts, for lawyers whose practice may be almost exclusively before those
bodies, [are] regulated by state law, and enforced by state courts.”226
In a final effort to defend its refusal to accept jurisdiction in Xitronix, the
Fifth Circuit tried to downplay the jurisdictional significance of the case-specific
nature of the federal question. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that, although
“any result would be ‘limited to the parties and patent involved in this matter,’”
that is “likely true of many patent cases,” and so “[i]f this consideration alone
sufficed to remove a case from the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, there
is no telling where the line should properly be drawn.”227 The Fifth Circuit is
surely correct that the mine-run of federal patent cases do not set groundbreaking
precedent and so their significance, like the Xitronix case itself, is limited to the
parties at bar. But the Fifth Circuit was wrong to suggest that, if the Federal
Circuit did not have jurisdiction over party-specific patent cases, jurisdictional
chaos would result. That is because the party-specific issues at the center of most
patent cases arise in the context of suits for patent infringement. Those cases
involve claims created by the federal Patent Act, so they indisputably arise under
patent law for jurisdictional purposes, regardless of whether the case has the

224

Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441.
See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 264–65.
226
FALLON ET AL., supra note 159, at 836. While state law and state courts will, under Gunn, define the
contours of malpractice law for patent lawyers, the Patent Office can still regulate matters of professionalism
and ethics through its Office of Enrollment and Discipline. See generally Office of Enrollment and Discipline,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel/
office-enrollment-and-discipline-oed (last modified July 17, 2019, 5:46 PM).
227
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 441 n.9.
225
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potential to set important precedent or is merely a fact-specific dispute over
infringement or validity. The case-specific nature of a dispute is sufficient to
defeat jurisdiction only in the comparatively rare case, like Xitronix, that
involves patent-related issues but does not include claims actually created by
patent law. So, the Fifth Circuit’s argument, which seems to suggest that the
Federal Circuit would have nothing to do if it did not have jurisdiction over
party-specific disputes embedded within non-patent claims, fails.
For now, the game of jurisdictional ping-pong in the Xitronix litigation
seems to be at an end. One month after the Fifth Circuit refused to accept
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit issued a per curiam order stating that it would
decide the case on the merits.228 But the court did not let the jurisdictional issue
lie. Rather, in its order, the court noted several “flaws” in the Fifth Circuit’s
analysis.229 First, the Federal Circuit criticized a statement by the Fifth Circuit
that, for a case to arise under patent law, “all” claims in the plaintiff’s wellpleaded complaint must raise substantial questions of patent law.230 Under
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit (correctly) noted, only one claim
needs to raise a substantial question of patent law so long as patent law is
“essential” to each “theory” of the claim.231 Second, the Federal Circuit derided
as “untenable” a suggestion by the Fifth Circuit that the scope of Federal Circuit
jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1) is broader than the district courts’ exclusive
jurisdiction under § 1338(a).232 I explore this issue in more detail below,233 but,
for present purposes, it suffices to say that the Federal Circuit made the
reasonable point that both statutes use the same, “arising under” phrase for the
same purpose: “to define the jurisdiction of particular federal courts.”234 Indeed,
as discussed, the federal courts have, for better or worse, interpreted the identical
language in both statutes in an identical fashion.235 Finally, the Federal Circuit
chided the Fifth Circuit for relying on Federal Circuit precedent on choice of
law to determine the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.236 Matters of
jurisdiction and choice of law in patent cases, the Federal Circuit noted, “are
related but distinct.”237
228
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 757 F. App’x 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
229
Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010.
230
Id. at 1009.
231
Id. (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810–11 (1988)).
232
Id.
233
See infra Part III.B.
234
Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1009.
235
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
236
Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1009.
237
Id.; see supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
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Despite these “flaws” in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the Federal Circuit
accepted jurisdiction over the Xitronix case, noting that the Fifth Circuit’s
conclusion that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction was “not implausible.”238
Yet, in accepting jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit (perhaps intentionally, perhaps
not) highlighted a clear intracircuit split in Federal Circuit jurisdictional law. In
explaining why it found the Fifth Circuit’s transfer decision “not implausible,”
the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn “could be
read to imply that whether the patent question at issue is substantial depends on
whether the patent is ‘live’ such that the resolution of any question of patent law
is not ‘merely hypothetical.’”239 In the case at hand, the Federal Circuit noted,
“the underlying patent has not expired.”240 In addition, the Federal Circuit wrote,
“the resolution of the [Walker Process] fraud question could affect [the patent’s]
enforceability”241 (perhaps acknowledging the mistake from its prior opinion in
which the court had said “[t]here is no dispute over the validity of the
[patent]”).242 This view—that any dispute about the infringement or validity of
a still-enforceable patent “arises under” patent law—is not only what the Fifth
Circuit held in Xitronix, it is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding in Jang
(as well as the Federal Circuit’s dicta in Forrester and Maxchief) that the
jurisdictional analysis turns on whether the patent might be asserted in
“subsequently arising infringement suits.”243
However, in the very next paragraph of its order accepting jurisdiction over
the Xitronix case, the Federal Circuit panel expressly disagreed with that view,
stating: “[W]e reject the theory that our jurisdiction turns on whether a patent
can still be asserted. Under this logic, cases involving Walker Process claims
based on expired patents would go to the regional circuits while those with
unexpired patents would come to us, despite raising the same legal questions.”244
While the panel’s point might be logical (and, as I argued above, faithful to
Supreme Court precedent), that is precisely the outcome contemplated by the
Federal Circuit’s opinions in Jang, Forrester, and Maxchief, which cabin
Gunn’s limits on jurisdiction to cases in which the underlying patent has been
invalidated or expired or is no longer enforceable.245
238

Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010.
Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 261 (2013)).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also supra notes 188–
91 and accompanying text.
243
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
244
Xitronix, 757 F. App’x at 1010.
245
See supra Part II.A. In a decision issued as this Article was going to press, another panel of the Federal
Circuit—also in conflict with cases such as Jang—wrote that “a run-of-the-mill question of infringement or
239
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C. Getting Jurisdiction Right, Sometimes
As the discussion thus far hopefully shows, there is serious confusion in the
emerging appellate case law on arising under jurisdiction in patent cases. But I
do not mean to suggest that courts since Gunn have never gotten the
jurisdictional analysis right. The Federal Circuit has, for instance, correctly
found that arising under jurisdiction existed in cases presenting purely legal
questions about the constitutionality of both state statutes246 and federal statutes
involving patents.247 Those constitutional challenges strongly resemble Smith in
that they present nearly pure questions about Congress’s power under the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause248 or otherwise seek to have patentrelated statutes declared facially invalid on constitutional grounds.249 The court
has also found arising under jurisdiction to be lacking over legal malpractice
cases involving expired patents, consistent with Gunn.250 As I explain below,
however, at least one of the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions involving a
malpractice claim and supposedly expired patents massages the facts of the case
to avoid inconsistency with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jang.251

validity” embedded within a state law claim does not create arising under jurisdiction, even if the patent remains
in force. Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The
portion of the opinion addressing Gunn’s requirement that the embedded federal question must be “substantial”
was plainly dicta, for the court also found that the plaintiff’s state-created unjust enrichment claim did not
necessarily raise a question of patent law. See id. at 1363. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit in Inspired
Development attempted to distinguish Jang on the ground that Jang involved a dispute over appellate jurisdiction
as between the Federal Circuit and a regional circuit under § 1295 whereas Inspired Development involved a
dispute over state court versus federal court jurisdiction under § 1338. See id at 1365. Yet current law does not
support that distinction: both §§ 1295 and 1338 use the same “arising under” language, and courts usually treat
precedent interpreting both sections interchangeably. Still, as a pure policy matter, it may make sense for the
federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction (vis-à-vis state courts) to be narrower than the Federal Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits). See infra Part III.B.
246
Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (constitutional challenge
to Vermont statute prohibiting “bad faith” acts of patent enforcement).
247
Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (constitutional challenge to the
provision of the America Invents Act (AIA) granting priority to the first inventor to file a patent application).
248
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have the power … [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
249
See Madstad, 756 F.3d at 1370 (challenge to the AIA under the Intellectual Property Clause); MPHJ,
803 F.3d at 642 (seeking a declaratory judgment that Vermont’s statute is “invalid or preempted … under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supremacy and Patent Clauses of the Constitution, and Title 35 of
the U.S. Code [the Patent Act]”).
250
See NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
251
See infra Part III.C, which discusses Alps South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 20181717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2018), a case in which the underlying patents had expired but
the statute of limitations had not yet run meaning that, like in Jang (and, for that matter, Xitronix), future
infringement suits could possibly be filed.
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The regional circuits, too, have correctly applied Gunn in several patentrelated cases. For instance, the Third Circuit, in the Lipitor case discussed above,
exercised jurisdiction over an appeal involving claims of Walker Process fraud
because there were theories under which the plaintiffs could successfully prove
their antitrust claims that had nothing to do with patent law.252 Also, the D.C.
Circuit recently exercised jurisdiction over a case involving claims for legal
malpractice that occurred during a failed patent prosecution, reasoning that the
case “like Gunn, involve[d] no forward-looking questions about any patent’s
validity, but instead solely concern[ed] whether unsuccessful patent applicants
can recover against their attorneys.”253 And the Fifth Circuit itself has exercised
jurisdiction over fraud claims involving failed patent applications, even though
those claims required the plaintiffs to prove the patentability of their alleged
inventions, because the patent issues were “hypothetical,” “fact-specific,” and
“of no importance to the federal system.”254
These decisions are helpful in formulating a clearer jurisdictional rule that is
faithful to Supreme Court precedent—a task the Article turns to now.
III. REDUCING CONFUSION ABOUT “ARISING UNDER” JURISDICTION IN
PATENT CASES
This final Part explores three broader implications of the more granular
critique of the prevailing jurisdictional case law presented thus far. First, it
synthesizes the doctrinal analysis above into a relatively clear jurisdictional rule
that should help reduce uncertainty about and litigation over subject matter
jurisdiction in many patent-related cases. Second, it considers a more radical
jurisdictional reform: removing the connection between the federal courts’
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases (to the exclusion of state courts) and the
Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits). Finally,
it returns to the Federal Circuit jurisdictional case law discussed above and
presents some initial evidence that those decisions are panel dependent—a
phenomenon that highlights some potential shortcomings of the Federal Circuit
as an institution.

252
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (“[A] claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may
not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.”).
253
Seed Co. v. Westerman, 832 F.3d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
254
USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 541 F. App’x 386, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2013).
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A. A Clearer Rule
1. Only Questions of Patent Law Trigger “Arising Under” Jurisdiction
Over Non-Patent Claims
Many scholars who have considered the question of when a claim created by
state law should nevertheless be considered to arise under federal law have
embraced malleable tests that give the federal courts discretion to exercise
jurisdiction based on the weighing of multiple factors,255 including the strength
of the federal interest in the case and the impact of a finding of jurisdiction on
the federal docket.256 The test for arising jurisdiction articulated in Gunn (drawn
from the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Grable), is a little less ad hoc—it
articulates four specific elements that must be satisfied for jurisdiction to
exist.257 But it also embraces more malleable considerations such as the strength
of the relevant federal interest and whether federal jurisdiction would upset the
“congressionally approved” balance of cases between the state and federal
courts.258 Indeed, despite Gunn’s four-element test, at least some courts of
appeals have distilled three “factors” they believe “assist” in determining the
most important element of that test: whether the embedded issue is “substantial”
in the sense that it is important to the federal system as a whole. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit, in the patent-related MDS case discussed above, articulated
those factors as follows:
First, a pure question of law is more likely to be a substantial federal
question. Second, a question that will control many other cases is more
likely to be a substantial federal question. Third, a question that the
government has a strong interest in litigating in a federal forum is more

255
See, e.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 916 (1967) (“Establishing [whether a state-created claim arises under
federal law] requires inquiries and guesses about such matters as these: the extent of the caseload increase for
federal trial courts if jurisdiction is recognized; the extent to which cases of this class will, in practice, turn on
issues of state or federal law; the extent of the necessity for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of federal
law that do arise; the extent of the necessity for a sympathetic federal tribunal in cases of this class.”).
256
See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 568 (1985) (“[N]o
formulation can possibly explain or even begin to account for the variety of outcomes [in cases involving
embedded federal questions] unless it accords sufficient room for the federal courts to make a range of choices
based on considerations of judicial administration and the degree of federal concern.”). But see Jonathan Remy
Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV.
509, 518 (2012) (highlighting the efficiency gains flowing from rule-based boundaries of federal subject matter
jurisdiction).
257
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a
federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in
federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”).
258
Id.
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likely to be a substantial federal question.259

The Federal Circuit has also articulated these three factors on occasion.260
As this Article has shown, a multifaceted, malleable, factor-driven
jurisdictional test has not proved easy for the courts to apply,261 at least in patent
cases. The work of applying that test and the uncertainty over the outcome may,
therefore, not be worth it. As the Hart and Wechsler book notes, the Supreme
Court has upheld federal question jurisdiction over state law claims in only four
cases in the past one hundred years, and, “[e]ven in the lower courts, rather few
decisions uphold jurisdiction.”262 The case in favor of an ill-defined standard is
even further undercut by the severe consequences of a determination that
jurisdiction is lacking—an objection that, to repeat, can be raised at any point in
the litigation.263
A simple rule that should be relatively easy to apply and that is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent is that the mere need to apply federal law is never
sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction.264 As the Court noted in Grable,
since Smith, the Court has “sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need
to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’

259

MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 842 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
See Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Grp., 781 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
261
I am, to be sure, not the first person to make this observation. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction
and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1913 (2004) (expressing, based on a review of the
relevant case law, “doubt[]” about “whether federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them are, can
in fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction predicated not upon a
federal claim for relief but instead upon a federal ingredient in a state law claim for relief”); Mr. Smith Goes to
Federal Court, supra note 77, at 2280 (finding that, from 1994 to 2002, the federal courts of appeals reversed
the lower court judgment in forty-five of the sixty-nine reported cases in which they discussed arising under
jurisdiction under over state-created claims); Nash, supra note 256, at 550–51 (arguing that the test for
determining whether a case “arises under” federal law should be more rule-like and easier to satisfy—”there
[should] be federal jurisdiction to hear a case even where the federal issue merely lurks in the background”—
but that the federal courts should retain discretion to abstain from hearing the case if the federal issues are not
“central” to the dispute).
262
FALLON ET AL., supra note 159, at 836.
263
See Martha A. Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping,
and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 611, 640 (2013) (noting that the cases in which federal
question jurisdiction exists over state-created claims “are few and far between, making unnecessary[]
discretionary jurisdictional rules that can disrupt a litigation in its final hours”).
264
Cf. Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under”
Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 340, 344 (2007) (suggesting “that federal question jurisdiction might be more
compelling for questions of law rather than application of clearly established law to fact” but asserting that
Grable “open[s] the lower federal court doors to claims requiring application or interpretation of federal law”
(emphasis added)).
260
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door.”265 “As early as 1912,” the Court continued, it “had confined federalquestion jurisdiction over state-law claims to those that ‘really and substantially
involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect
of [federal] law.’”266 Indeed, a year after deciding Grable, the Court in Empire
refused to uphold federal question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim
involving an insurance policy issued under a contract with the federal
government, emphasizing that Grable presented a nearly “pure issue of law”—
what does “notice” mean under the federal tax statute?—an issue “that could be
settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.”267
The Court in Empire also emphasized that “[t]he state court in which the
personal-injury suit was lodged is competent to apply federal law, to the extent
it is relevant.”268
In Smith, too, a pure question of federal constitutional law was at stake: Was
the Farm Loan Act within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause? As
the Supreme Court noted in upholding jurisdiction: “[T]he controversy concerns
the constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn into
question. The decision depends upon the determination of this issue.”269
A rule holding that the mere need to apply federal law is not sufficient to
create arising under jurisdiction is also consistent with the other two (less
prominent) examples of Supreme Court cases upholding federal question
jurisdiction over non-federal claims (in addition to Smith and Grable). Hopkins
v. Walker, decided in 1917 (before Smith, actually), involved a state law claim
to remove a cloud on title stemming from two apparently conflicting federal land
grants.270 Based on that fact alone, the Court’s decision to uphold jurisdiction
could be said to stand for proposition that a dispute over the validity of a federal
grant of right—such as a utility patent—within a state law claim does indeed
arise under federal law, consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jang
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Xitronix. Interestingly, however, neither of
those decisions cited Hopkins. And, in any event, it is clear that the claim in
Hopkins turned on purely legal questions about the meaning and content of
federal law. As the Supreme Court wrote: “[T]he determination of the plaintiffs’

265

Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005).
Id. (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (alteration in original); see also Moore
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 213 (1934) (holding that a state law tort claim did not arise under
federal law even though the claim was premised on the defendant’s violation of a federal statute).
267
Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700 (2006).
268
Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
269
Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921).
270
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 488–89 (1917).
266
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rights requires a construction of the [federal] mining laws under which the
proceedings resulting in the patent were had ….”271
The final Supreme Court decision upholding federal question jurisdiction
over a state-created claim, City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons,272 contains little analysis of the jurisdictional issue, but it, too, can be
read to be consistent with a rule holding that the mere need to apply federal law
does not trigger arising under jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiffs filed claims
under Illinois law seeking judicial review of a municipal agency’s land use
decisions.273 As the Supreme Court explained, the plaintiffs’ complaints raised
several federal constitutional claims, including that the relevant local
ordinances, both facially and as applied, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.274 In a very brief discussion, the Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction, noting simply that “[a]s we have explained, … ‘[e]ven though state
law creates [a party’s] causes of action, its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws
of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief
under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’”275
In the Court’s view, the plaintiffs’ “federal constitutional claims, which turn
exclusively on federal law, unquestionably fit within this rule.”276 Though some
aspects of the plaintiffs’ claims could be said to require merely applying federal
law (for instance, their as-applied challenge to the relevant ordinances
challenged “the manner in which the [agency] conducted its administrative
proceedings”277), the facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the
ordinances seems to have unquestionably presented a pure question of federal
law.
The notion that the need to apply federal law is not sufficient to create arising
under jurisdiction and that, instead, a purely legal question is required draws
some interesting support from Justice Holmes’s opinion in American Well
Works, in which he made the statement—usually identified as underinclusive—
that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”278 American
Well Works was actually a patent case. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
had committed a tort by “falsely and maliciously” stating that a pump

271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Id. (emphasis added).
522 U.S. 156 (1997).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 164.
Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 160.
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).

GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19

504

12/9/2019 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:459

manufactured by the plaintiff infringed the defendants’ patent and threatening
and bringing infringement suits against the users of the plaintiff’s pump.279
Though the veracity of the allegations of infringement and the validity of the
defendants’ patent would surely be an issue in the case, Justice Holmes found
those issues insufficient to create federal jurisdiction, noting, in the sentence
immediately following the famous statement about a case arising under the law
that creates the claim: “The fact that the justification [for the threats of suit] may
involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the
question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of
contract.”280 In other words, even setting aside the creation test, it seems that
Justice Holmes thought the American Well Works case would not arise under
federal law because it involved case-specific issues of infringement and
validity.281
2. Objections and Responses
Throughout the discussion above, I have attempted to anticipate and respond
to potential criticisms of the reimagined jurisdictional rule I have proposed,
which focuses on the existence of a question of federal patent law embedded
within a non-patent claim. This subpart highlights the most important objections
to my argument and provides a few additional responses.
First, one might contend that Federal Circuit cases such as Jang already
provide a relatively clear rule: Any issue about the infringement or validity of
an in-force patent creates arising under jurisdiction. Indeed, aspects of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn can be understood to support the view that
case-specific issues of infringement or validity of a patent that remains in force

279

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 260.
281
Though American Well Works is usually understood to concern the “substantiality” element of federal
question jurisdiction, the opinion might be better understood as finding no jurisdiction because the federal
issue—whether or not substantial—was not part of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded tort claim. Specifically, Justice
Holmes’s opinion seemed to indicate that the plaintiff could have prevailed separate and apart from the validity
or infringement of the patent. He wrote: “If the State adopted for civil proceedings the saying of the old criminal
law: the greater the truth the greater the libel, the validity of the patent would not come in question at all. In
Massachusetts the truth would not be a defence if the statement was made from disinterested malevolence.” Id.;
see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (“If ‘on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint there are … reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws] why the
[plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks,’ then the claim does not ‘arise under’ those laws.”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S.
1, 26 (1983))). It is worth noting that American Well Works was decided before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), so, even though the American Well Works case itself began in federal district court in Arkansas,
the federal court was applying the “general law” of torts.
280
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can trigger arising under jurisdiction because resolution of those issues could
have “forward-looking” effects in future litigation involving the same patent.
For instance, in explaining why the patent question embedded in the plaintiff’s
malpractice claim was not substantial, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion noted
that, regardless of the outcome of the malpractice suit, “Minton’s patent will
remain invalid.”282 One could infer from this passage that a case in which the
patent has not yet expired or been ruled invalid would arise under federal patent
law.
Yet there are also, as noted, many aspects of the Gunn opinion emphasizing
that questions that are important only to the parties to the case and the patent in
suit are not the type of “substantial” federal questions that cause a case to arise
under federal patent law.283 And all of the Supreme Court’s prior decisions
upholding federal question jurisdiction based on embedded federal issues
involved pure issues of law that would affect future cases involving litigants who
were not parties to the case at hand. So the distinction drawn by the Federal
Circuit between party-specific, backward-looking issues (no jurisdiction) and
party-specific, forward-looking issues (jurisdiction), is on shaky doctrinal
footing.
Moreover, for the reasons explained above,284 an embedded finding on
infringement or validity of an in-force patent will often have little or no forwardlooking effects. On the issue of infringement, defendants who might be sued by
the patentee in the future will frequently be employing products or processes
that differ from the accused products or processes in the first suit. And, on
validity, due process significantly limits forward-looking impact, as a patentee
may not offensively rely on a finding that its patent is not invalid against
different accused infringers in the future. Thus, case-specific, party-specific, and
patent-specific issues of validity or infringement, even though they require a
court to apply federal patent law, do not seem like the type of questions that are
sufficiently important to the federal system as a whole to justify jurisdiction
under Gunn. A purely legal question about the content of federal patent law, by
contrast, would trigger exclusive jurisdiction because the resolution of that
282

Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 261 (2013).
See, e.g., id. at 263 (“[E]ven assuming that a state court’s case-within-a-case adjudication may be
preclusive under some circumstances, the result would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before
the state court. Such ‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ effects are not sufficient to establish federal arising
under jurisdiction.” (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006))); id.
at 263–64 (“There is no doubt that resolution of a patent issue in the context of a state legal malpractice action
can be vitally important to the particular parties in that case. But something more, demonstrating that the question
is significant to the federal system as a whole, is needed.”).
284
See supra Part II.A.
283
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question would affect numerous future cases involving litigants who were not
parties to the original suit, similar to a case like Grable.
Another possible objection to a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence
of a pure question of patent law being embedded within a non-patent claim is
that the line between questions of law and questions of fact in patent cases is
hazy; many issues in patent litigation that are highly case specific, such as claim
construction and validity, are actually considered to present questions of law.285
However, many of those questions of law are resolved based on factual
considerations,286 so they are not the pure questions of law that would trigger
jurisdiction under the rule I propose. Moreover, the notion that certain casespecific and patent-specific issues of patent scope or validity present entirely
legal questions is, as I have explained in prior writing, normatively dubious.287
This is not the space for a comprehensive analysis of the law/fact divide in patent
litigation—I will save that analysis for future work.288 For present purposes, it
suffices to say that, when I argue that a question of patent law is required to
trigger jurisdiction, I mean the sort of abstract question that can be resolved
without reference to the particulars of the case,289 such as a question of statutory
interpretation or of the constitutional validity of some provision of the patent
statute.290 Contrary to Federal Circuit decisions such as Jang, issues about the
scope or validity of one particular patent are not sufficient.
285
See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 913–
15 (7th ed. 2017) (summarizing the law/fact distinction on numerous issues that arise in patent litigation).
286
See generally Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (“While we held in
Markman that the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a claim should be treated as a question of law, we
also recognized that in patent construction, subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary. Indeed, we referred
to claim construction as a practice with ‘evidentiary underpinnings,’ a practice that ‘falls somewhere between a
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.’” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 378, 388, 390 (1996))); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011) (“While the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law, the same factual questions underlying the PTO’s original examination
of a patent application will also bear on an invalidity defense in an infringement action.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))).
287
See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 608, 627 (arguing that both patent eligibility and claim construction,
two issues often treated by courts as presenting purely legal questions, instead have significant factual aspects).
288
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Law, Fact, and Patent Validity (Nov. 13, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
289
See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 882 n.68 (1992).
290
E.g., Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014). It is worth noting that
federal district judges frequently must draw lines between pure questions of law, mixed questions of law and
fact, and pure questions of fact when, for instance, determining whether an interlocutory appeal is permissible.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (permittting judges to certify an order for immediate appeal if, among other things, it
presents a “controlling question of law”); see also Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d
369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The question of law certified for interlocutory appeal must refer to a pure question
of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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Attacking my argument from the other direction, it is worth noting that one
passage of the Gunn opinion seems to suggest that even a novel, pure question
of federal patent law would not be sufficient to trigger arising under jurisdiction
absent other considerations indicating a strong federal interest in the case. In that
passage, the Chief Justice first rejected the argument that the need for legal
uniformity counseled in favor of federal jurisdiction over the malpractice suit,
emphasizing that “state courts can be expected to hew closely to the pertinent
federal precedents” when deciding what would have happened in the underlying
infringement suit but for the attorney’s alleged negligence.291 “As for more novel
questions of patent law that may arise for the first time in a state court ‘case
within a case,’” the Chief Justice continued, “they will at some point be decided
by a federal court in the context of an actual patent case, with review in the
Federal Circuit.”292 This statement could be read to mean that the nature of the
question (legal versus factual) is not dispositive in the jurisdictional analysis.
But Chief Justice Roberts’s statement cannot be taken literally. If it were true
that questions of federal law cannot trigger arising under jurisdiction when those
questions might eventually be decided by a federal court, then both Smith and
Grable were wrongly decided. The issue about the meaning of “notice” in the
federal tax statute could have arisen in a future case brought directly against the
IRS challenging the legality of a seizure.293 Similarly, in a case like Smith, which
implicated federally chartered banks, federal treasury bonds, and numerous
banks in which the U.S. Treasury had invested public funds,294 the
constitutionality of the Farm Loan Act could have been raised in a variety of
suits falling within federal question jurisdiction, to say nothing of the possibility
of diversity jurisdiction or of the extremely high likelihood of Supreme Court
review if a state court found an act of Congress unconstitutional.295 Thus, the
Chief Justice’s statement is probably best read as making a point unique to patent
cases: If a state law claim raises a novel question about the legal requirements
for patent validity or infringement, that question is likely to arise in a future
infringement suit—and the federal courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over
that suit. By contrast, in cases like Grable and Smith, the relevant question of

291

Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 262 (2013).
Id.
293
For an example of a case brought directly against the IRS challenging the adequacy of notice under the
same statute at issue in Grable, see Kabakjian v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439–40 (E.D. Pa. 2000),
aff’d, 267 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2001).
294
See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 196–97 (1921).
295
See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 264 (10th ed. 2013) (“Where the decision
below holds a federal statute unconstitutional … certiorari is usually granted because of the obvious importance
of the case.”).
292
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federal law might be raised in the future, and the federal courts might have
jurisdiction (though certainly not exclusive jurisdiction). Because the possibility
of future resolution of that federal question by a federal court in a case like
Grable or Smith is more speculative, there is a stronger reason for a federal court
to exercise jurisdiction over a state-created claim raising that issue.
Another critique of a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence of a
question of patent law involves matters of timing. How can a trial court deciding
jurisdiction at the outset of a case know whether the case involves a jurisdictiontriggering legal question? This critique, however, can largely be answered
through the principle that the burden of proof lies on the party attempting to
invoke federal jurisdiction.296 So a plaintiff who wants to file, say, a patent
malpractice claim in federal court would have the burden of identifying a
specific legal question that triggers jurisdiction and of convincing the court that
that legal question is essential to each of its theories of recovery. Things could
be trickier in a removal scenario, where the defendant would have to identify a
question of patent law in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, but it would not
be unreasonable to ask the defendant to at least try to do so. (Think of it as the
defendant carrying an initial burden of production.) The burden would then shift
to the plaintiff to explain why there is, in fact, no question of patent law
embedded in its claim, with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that
jurisdiction exists remaining on the defendant.
One final objection to a jurisdictional rule that turns on the existence of a
question of law is grounded in an alternative interpretation of the leading
Supreme Court cases on embedded federal questions. The cases in which the
Court has upheld jurisdiction over state-created claims all arguably presented
disputes over the legality of an action taken by the federal government. Smith
(constitutionality of an act of Congress) and Grable (legality of an IRS tax
seizure), most notably, fit this mold. One might say that a case in which an inforce federal patent might be held invalid similarly presents a question about the
legality of an action taken by the federal government (issuing a patent) and so
similarly justifies arising under jurisdiction.
A rule that jurisdiction exists when the validity of an in-force patent is in
dispute is, I readily admit, the most appealing alternative to the rule I have
proposed. It has support in Supreme Court precedent, and it is relatively clear.
Indeed, it could actually function as a complement to the rule I have proposed.
Arising under jurisdiction could exist if the case presents either (a) a pure

296

See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
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question of patent law or (b) a question about the validity of a patent that can
still be enforced. In the end, however, the legality of a patent examiner issuing
one particular patent seems so inconsequential to the federal system as a
whole—arguably the key consideration of both Grable and Gunn297—that it
probably should not trigger “arising under” jurisdiction—particularly in a patent
case, where, if a court finds that there is a substantial question of patent law
embedded within a state law claim, state courts are entirely excluded from
shaping their own state’s law in that area.298
Moreover, both Grable and Smith can be distinguished from a case in which
the embedded federal issue is a case-specific, fact-specific question about patent
validity. Grable was, of course, a dispute about the legality of the IRS’s tax
seizure activities, but the case would also set legal precedent about the type of
notice the tax statue requires. Smith, too, was a dispute over the legality of an
act of Congress, but that dispute turned on an entirely legal inquiry into
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Finally, though the notion that
jurisdiction exists any time there is a dispute over the validity of an in-force
patent appears to be a relatively clear rule, determining whether a patent is “in
force” is not always as easy as it would seem. The statute of limitations for a
claim of patent infringement extends for six years beyond the patent’s
expiration,299 meaning that even rulings about the validity of an expired patent
can have forward-looking effects. And breach of licensing cases often involve
numerous patents, some of which may have been invalidated or expired and
others that have not.300 Indeed, federal judges deciding patent-related
jurisdictional disputes are often confused about whether the relevant patents are
or are not in force.301

297
See, e.g., Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260 (“As our past cases show, … it is not enough that the federal issue be
significant to the particular parties in the immediate suit; that will always be true when the state claim
‘necessarily raise[s]’ a disputed federal issue, as Grable separately requires. The substantiality inquiry under
Grable looks instead to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.” (second alteration in
original)).
298
Cf. Dell Techs. Inc. v. TiVo Corp., No. 1:18-CV-666-LY, 2019 WL 2410085, at *10 (W.D. Tex. June
6, 2019) (declining jurisdiction over a breach of contract case with an embedded question of patent infringement,
noting that “allowing this case to proceed forward in federal court would … diminish the role of the state of
Texas in regulating commercial agreements and misrepresentations”).
299
35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012).
300
Cf. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no
“arising under” jurisdiction over a breach of license dispute where one of the relevant patents had expired but
others had not).
301
See, e.g., Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (characterizing MDS as having ruled that “the
question of infringement was not substantial because the patent had expired” when, in fact, only one of the
relevant patents had expired); Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 440 (5th Cir. 2019) (repeating
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To be sure, if the issue ever came before the Supreme Court, the Court might
well rule that the validity of an in-force patent is a substantial question of patent
law that warrants exclusive federal and Federal Circuit jurisdiction because of
the preclusive effects that stem from a finding of invalidity. In my view,
however, issues about the validity of one particular patent, though they might
raise questions about the legality of an action by the federal government (issuing
a patent), are not sufficiently important to federal system as a whole to create
jurisdiction under Gunn.
B. Delinking District Court and Federal Circuit Jurisdiction
The discussion in the Article thus far has largely blended analysis of district
court jurisdiction with Federal Circuit jurisdiction because the two statutes use
the same “arising under” language and, under current law, are interpreted to have
the same scope. As a normative matter, however, current law arguably makes
little sense. Suppose, for example, a civil action raising case-specific patent
issues is properly in federal district court beyond dispute, perhaps because,
whether or not the embedded patent issues are substantial, the parties have
diverse citizenship (and the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied)302
or there are federally created claims in the case that clearly create jurisdiction
under the general federal question statute.303 Under Federal Circuit decisions
such as Jang, most of those cases will be routed to the Federal Circuit on appeal.
Under the more stringent interpretation of Gunn that I have proposed, as well as
the Federal Circuit panel’s original decision in Xitronix, cases involving partyor patent-specific issues of infringement or validity will be heard by the regional
circuits. One potential policy defense of this latter regime is that it would be
good for courts besides the Federal Circuit to decide patent cases sometimes.
Many commentators have identified the lack of “percolation” by peer-level
courts as a significant problem in modern patent law,304 and so they have
proposed having additional courts of appeals decide patent cases.305 But the

the argument that the patent in MDS had expired), cert. denied, 2019 WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019); Alps
South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 14,
2018) (discussing a district court decision erroneously concluding that the statute of limitations for infringement
had expired).
302
See, e.g., Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
303
See, e.g., Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 442.
304
See Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?,
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2013). But cf. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”:
A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009) (suggesting
that the Supreme Court can perform the function of percolating patent law—a task performed by the various
regional circuits in most other areas of federal law).
305
See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 48, at 1661.
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cases that truly involve the contours of federal patent law will—under practically
any understanding of Gunn—still be routed to the Federal Circuit. So,
percolation is not an adequate justification for a regime in which the only issues
of patent law decided by the regional circuits are case-specific issues of validity
and infringement. Is a better jurisdictional design possible?
Though the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Xitronix has numerous flaws, many of
which I detailed above, the opinion concluded with an interesting law-reform
argument. Specifically, the court questioned whether Gunn, which involved a
dispute over state-versus-exclusive-federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a), should
apply to cases like Xitronix, which involved a dispute over regional-circuitversus-Federal-Circuit jurisdiction under §1295(a)(1).306 As the Fifth Circuit
noted, Gunn’s formulation of the “substantiality” requirement—which focuses
on the importance of the case to the federal system as a whole—makes little
sense as a criterium for sorting cases among the federal courts of appeals.307 And
the fourth element of the test for federal jurisdiction under Grable and Gunn—
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction must not upset the congressionally
approved balance of authority between the state and federal judiciaries—“is
even less suited to the task of sorting cases between the circuits,” as the Fifth
Circuit also noted.308
Indeed, there are good reasons for the test for Federal Circuit jurisdiction—
once a case is properly in federal court—to be broader than the test for exclusive
federal jurisdiction in the district courts. In choosing between state and exclusive
federal jurisdiction, there are, as noted, weighty federalism considerations at
play.309 Exclusive federal jurisdiction deprives state courts of the ability to shape
their own state’s law simply because a case involves a federal patent. Though a
multi-element, multi-factor test for jurisdiction (such as the test in Gunn as
interpreted by the lower courts) incentivizes costly litigation over forum
selection, that litigation may be worth it given those stakes.
But once a patent-related case is properly in federal court, it is not clear what
interest is served by applying the stringent Gunn test to sort cases among the
circuits. If the case is in federal court under the general federal question statute
(a patent-related antitrust claim, for instance), there are no federalism values to
protect whatsoever. If the case is in federal court because of diversity (a patentrelated breach of contract case, perhaps), it might be suggested that the judges
306
307
308
309

Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 442.
Id.
Id.
See Gugliuzza, supra note 47, at 69–70.

GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19

512

12/9/2019 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:459

of the regional circuits are more familiar with the relevant state law that governs
the non-patent aspects of the claim under Erie. But that concern about the
relative expertise of regional circuit versus Federal Circuit judges on matters of
state law is a far cry from the trial-level concern about entirely disabling state
courts from deciding claims created by their own state’s law. Moreover, any
expertise gained by having regional circuit judges decide state law issues could
be outweighed by those judges’ inexperience in handling the issues of patent
infringement or validity embedded within the state law claim. In short, there is
a solid (if not locktight) normative argument that the Federal Circuit should have
jurisdiction over federal question and even diversity cases that require mere
application of patent law.
Though such a regime could be appealing as a policy matter, both
§ 1295(a)(1) (the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute) and § 1338(a) (which
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal district courts) use the exact same
“arising under” language. And the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted on
“linguistic consistency” when interpreting that phrase, at least as it appears in
§ 1338 and the general federal question statute, § 1331.310 The Court has also
equated the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction under § 1338 with the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction under § 1295,311 though that case, it is worth noting,
involved an older version of § 1295, which explicitly referenced § 1338, making
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction turn on whether the district court’s jurisdiction
was based, “in whole or in part, on section 1338.”312
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Xitronix, the America Invents Act (AIA),
passed in 2011, amended the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute to delete the
reference to § 1338.313 Section 1295(a)(1) now confers on the Federal Circuit
jurisdiction over cases involving claims or counterclaims “arising under … any
Act of Congress relating to patents.”314 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on that
statutory change to argue that Gunn’s test for allocating patent-related cases
between the federal courts and state courts should not apply when allocating
appeals among the circuits.315
The change of language in the AIA, however, would be a subtle way of
310
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 829–30 (2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988).
311
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814.
312
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
313
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011).
314
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
315
See Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 916 F.3d 429, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2019
WL 4921285 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019).
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overruling a large body of case law that has applied the same jurisdictional test
under both § 1295 and § 1338.316 As the Supreme Court noted in a recent
decision on another procedural issue in patent law (venue), when Congress
wants to overturn a settled practice of the federal courts, Congress must make
its intent clear in the text of the statute.317 Yet the statutory text, as noted, uses
the exact same phrase to delineate both the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Moreover, I can find
nothing in the legislative history of the amendment to § 1295 to indicate that
Congress sought to delink the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction from the
exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts.318
Still, the idea of disconnecting district court and Federal Circuit jurisdiction
is an interesting one, and the Fifth Circuit offered some persuasive reasons for
doing so:
It would be quite reasonable to have a system that imposes different
restrictions at the entrance to the federal system and at the fork in the
road leading to different circuits. The exclusionary Gunn-Grable test,
screening out most potential cases at the entrance, protects federal district courts from overload and reflects constitutional respect for state
courts and state prerogatives. As to those cases that do make it into the
federal system, preservation of uniformity comes to the fore, furthered
by Christianson’s inclusionary test for routing appeals to the Federal
Circuit. [That is, the standard under which the Federal Circuit must
accept a transfer so long as the transferee court’s jurisdictional analysis
is “plausible” and not “clearly erroneous.”] Such a test also promotes
judicial economy by simplifying the jurisdictional inquiry and avoiding the jurisdictional ping-pong that Christianson aimed to end.319

In short, there are good reasons, grounded in federalism, for federal courts
to be cautious about finding that a state law claim must be decided exclusively
316
In addition to the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson, the Federal Circuit has equated these two
statutes in numerous decisions, including several issued after Gunn. See, e.g., Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor
Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 645–46 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Krauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., 753
F.3d 1263, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
317
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) (“When Congress
intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text
of the amended provision.”).
318
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-407 (2006) (report on an earlier version
of the amendment that was eventually incorporated into the AIA); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History
of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539–40 (2011) (describing the purpose of the
amendment to § 1295(a)(1) as being to “extend the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to compulsory patent
… counterclaims, abrogating Holmes Group”).
319
Xitronix, 916 F.3d at 443.
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by the federal courts under § 1338(a)320—hence my proposed rule limiting
exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a) to cases raising pure questions of
federal patent law. But once a case is already in federal court—either because
the claim is created by federal law and indisputability falls within the federal
courts’ general federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 (as was the case in
Xitronix) or because there is diversity jurisdiction (as was the case in Jang)—
the Federal Circuit’s expertise on patent matters and the general desire for
uniformity in patent law and the adjudication of patent cases could plausibly be
said to warrant Federal Circuit jurisdiction. In other words, while the mere need
to apply federal patent law ought not be sufficient to trigger exclusive federal
jurisdiction under § 1338(a), those same issues perhaps should warrant Federal
Circuit appellate jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1).321
C. The Panel Dependency of Federal Circuit Jurisdictional Rulings
Turning back to the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisdictional decisions to
conclude the Article. Though the set of post-Gunn rulings in the Federal Circuit
is, quantitatively speaking, relatively small, there is some intriguing evidence of
panel dependency that is worth pointing out. On my reading of the case law, it
seems clear that at least three judges—all of whom have participated in multiple
hotly disputed cases—have strong views on the proper scope of the federal
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over cases arising under patent law.
First, Judge Dyk appears to clearly favor a broad scope of arising under
320
Cf. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–32 (2002) (Scalia, J.)
(holding that allowing a patent law counterclaim to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over patent
cases would fail to respect “the rightful independence of state governments”).
321
In an opinion issued as this Article was going to press, the Federal Circuit suggested that cases such as
Jang, which hold that a case arises under patent law any time the court must decide an issue of validity or
infringement of an in-force patent, are relevant only to determining the scope of Federal Circuit appellate
jurisdiction (vis-à-vis the regional circuits) under § 1295; cases involving fact-specific issues of validity or
infringement, the court wrote, do not trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction (vis-à-vis state courts) under § 1338.
Inspired Dev. Grp., LLC v. Inspired Prods. Grp., LLC, 938 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Jang’s reasoning
is worlds away from the supposed state-federal conflict here. The analysis in Jang took place entirely between
federal courts.”). That suggestion was contained in a portion of the opinion that was clearly dicta, see supra note
245, and it is difficult to justify under earlier Federal Circuit opinions viewing the scope of §§ 1295 and 1338 to
be identical, see supra notes 43, 62. The Federal Circuit in Inspired Development attempted to explain away
Jang by noting that the dispute in Jang—which involved Federal Circuit versus regional circuit jurisdiction—
raised a question that was important “to the federal system as a whole” under Gunn because different federal
courts might reach different conclusions about the validity of a single patent. Inspired Dev., 938 F.3d at 1365.
As explained above, however, principles of issue preclusion would ensure against any such differing conclusions
(at least to the maximum extent permitted by due process), regardless of which court decided the first case. See
supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text. Still, though Inspired Developments is questionable as a matter of
existing doctrine, the opinion is consistent with this Article’s normative argument for different jurisdictional
rules at the trial level and on appeal.
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jurisdiction. He was the author of the opinions in both Forrester and Maxchief,
two opinions that each espoused—in passages that were unnecessary to the
court’s decision—the view that case-specific issues of validity or infringement
of a patent that can still be enforced justify jurisdiction.322 And Judge Dyk was
on the panel in Jang, the case that imported that dicta from Forrester into a
holding of the court.323 Though Judge Linn wrote the Jang opinion, that opinion
relied heavily on an earlier, pre-Gunn opinion in that same litigation that had
upheld jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s “right to relief on [his] contract claim
… depends on an issue of federal patent law—whether the stents sold by [the
defendants] would have infringed [the plaintiff’s] patents.”324 That earlier
opinion, it may not be surprising to learn, was written by Judge Dyk (and joined
by Judge Linn).
Second, Judge Newman seems to similarly adhere to a broad conception of
arising under jurisdiction. She was on the panel in Forrester—the case in which
Judge Dyk wrote that the Federal Circuit’s case law extending arising under
jurisdiction to tort claims based on allegedly false assertions of patent
infringement “may well have survived … Gunn.”325 And she dissented from the
denial of rehearing en banc in Xitronix, arguing that case-specific issues of
patent validity or enforceability are sufficient to trigger the federal district
courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.326
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, is Judge Moore. Most significantly,
she wrote the opinion in Xitronix holding that a case-specific issue of Walker
Process fraud did not cause the case to arise under patent law.327 Moreover,
Judge Moore wrote a nonprecedential opinion finding no jurisdiction in a case
decided one day before Xitronix, Alps South, LLC v. Shumaker, Loop &
Kendrick.328 That case involved malpractice claims against attorneys who had
handled prior infringement litigation.329 In holding that federal jurisdiction was
lacking under § 1338(a), Judge Moore’s opinion noted (quoting the district
322
Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Wok & Pan, Ind., Inc., 909 F.3d 1134, 1140 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
323
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334).
324
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008), quoted in Jang, 767 F.3d at 1336.
325
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334.
326
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 892 F.3d 1194, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). That said, Judge Newman joined Chief Judge
Prost’s recent opinion in Inspired Development, which asserted in dicta that a case-specific issue of infringement
is not sufficient to trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338 even if, under Jang, such an issue is
sufficient to trigger Federal Circuit jurisdiction under § 1295. Inspired Dev., 938 F.3d at 1365.
327
Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
328
No. 2018-1717, 2018 WL 4522168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
329
Id. at *1.
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court’s opinion in the case) that the relevant patents “expired years ago, which
minimizes (or more accurately, eliminates) the prospect of a conflict between a
state-court decision in this action and a federal decision in another infringement
action over the same patents.”330
Based on that description of the case, it seems as if it is on all fours with
Gunn. The patent issues were case-specific, backward-looking, hypothetical
questions of validity or infringement of a patent that had already expired. It turns
out, however, that the district court was wrong that no infringement suit could
be filed in the future. Judge Moore noted—apparently contrary to the district
court’s understanding—that “the statute of limitations for seeking damages for
infringement of the patents has not yet expired.”331 Thus, rather than being on
all fours with Gunn, Alps South was actually similar to Jang, which upheld
jurisdiction because adjudication of the patent issue embedded within the breach
of contract claim could impact a future infringement suit.332
Nevertheless, Judge Moore ruled—contrary to Jang (but consistent with the
understanding of Gunn that I urged above)—that such an embedded patent issue
was not sufficient to create arising under jurisdiction.333 She gave two reasons.
First, “even if [the plaintiff] brought another suit, the district court correctly
explained that the state court’s resolution of any patent issues in this malpractice
case would lack any preclusive effect on that federal action.”334 But that is
simply not true. As explained above, state court rulings can have preclusive
effects in future litigation, including litigation in federal court and almost
certainly in patent cases.335 Second, Judge Moore’s opinion in Alps South noted
that any state court ruling on infringement or validity “would be limited to the
patents and those parties.”336 This view—that case-specific issues of validity and
infringement are insubstantial for jurisdictional purposes—is consistent with the
opinion in Xitronix that Judge Moore would release the next day. But it is at odds
with the broader conceptions of arising under jurisdiction embraced by Judges
Dyk and Newman.337

330

Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
Id.
332
Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
333
Alps South, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3–4.
334
Id. at *3.
335
See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
336
Alps South, 2018 WL 4522168, at *3.
337
In analyzing particular Federal Circuit judges’ views about the scope of arising under jurisdiction, it is
also worth noting that, before the Supreme Court decided Gunn, Judge O’Malley penned several opinions
objecting to the Federal Circuit’s then-expansive jurisdictional rule, see Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 1341,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP,
331
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I should repeat that the sample size here is small. On my review of the
relevant case law, there are only eleven Federal Circuit decisions since Gunn
that contain a significant analysis of whether arising under jurisdiction exists.
And six of those decisions seem relatively uncontroversial. In two cases, the
court approved of jurisdiction over cases involving pure questions of patent law
that were embedded within claims that were not for patent infringement.338 A
third case involved claims that actually were for patent infringement.339 Finally,
three decisions declined jurisdiction over cases that asserted theories of relief
that had nothing to do with patent law.340
It is also worth noting that, pursuant to the (infamous?) Federal Circuit Rule
36, the Federal Circuit resolves a large proportion of its appeals without issuing
any opinion at all.341 Without performing significantly more research (to wit,
reviewing every brief in every case decided in a Rule 36 affirmance),342 it is
impossible to know how many of those cases involved plausible disputes over
jurisdiction. Still, to see three judges making repeat appearances and taking

676 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring); USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 676
F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., concurring), vacated, 569 U.S. 915 (2013); Byrne v. Wood,
Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 450 F. App’x 956, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(authoring majority opinion exercising jurisdiction but questioning the relevant precedent), vacated, 568 U.S.
1190 (2013). Interestingly, both of Judge O’Malley’s post-Gunn jurisdictional opinions uphold jurisdiction, but
those cases were relatively easy ones under governing precedent. See infra note 338 and accompanying text.
338
Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J.); Madstad
Eng’g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J.).
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knowledgeable patent lawyer—did it for our article on Rule 36. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 53, at 782
n.84. But it is not easy. See id. at 809 (noting that “many lawyers don’t have the time (or the financial resources)
to dig through dockets and briefs … to determine the basis for the nearly 200 Rule 36 affirmances the Federal
Circuit issues every year” and arguing that, instead of opinionless affirmances, the Federal Circuit should
generally issue a “short, nonprecedential opinion making clear the arguments raised by the appellant (and
rejected by the court)”).

GUGLIUZZAPROOFS_12.5.19

518

12/9/2019 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:459

consistent—and diametrically opposed—positions on one particular issue is
noteworthy and merits attention going forward.
The panel dependency of Federal Circuit law on matters of jurisdiction (and
on numerous other issues343) highlights a potential shortcoming of the Federal
Circuit as an institution: The narrowness of the court’s jurisdiction encourages
its judges to develop detailed normative preferences about issues of patent law
and policy, and it provides them with ample opportunities to express and
implement those preferences. One additional benefit of clearer jurisdictional
rules—such as the one proposed in this Article—is that they are harder to
manipulate in service of a preferred policy outcome.
CONCLUSION
Confusion about the scope of the federal courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction over patent cases is on the rise. This Article has provided an
extensive review of the relevant precedent and attempted to bring some clarity
to the legal doctrine. Under the novel approach I propose, for a case to arise
under patent law, it must present a dispute about the content of federal patent
law or a question about the interpretation or validity of the federal patent statute.
This Article has also sought to highlight the normatively questionable basis for
equating the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction over patent cases with the
original jurisdiction of the district courts. Given the panel dependence on
jurisdictional matters that seems to prevail in the Federal Circuit, subject matter
jurisdiction, perhaps surprisingly, promises to be one of the most confounding
and controversial issues in patent litigation for years to come.
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See id. at 798–99.

